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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 Plaintiffs allege that provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2009 (the “Act”) are outside of Congress‟ delegated powers under the 
United States Constitution, and violate the First, Fifth and Tenth Amendments and 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b). 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343.  
 Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment dismissing all causes of action of the 
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
in which the district court reached the merits of the case. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The final judgment was entered on 
November 30, 2010 and Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on December 1, 2010.  
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 
1. Whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
a private citizen‟s inactivity in commerce (a decision not to purchase health 
insurance and to otherwise privately manage her own healthcare) and force said 
citizen to participate in commerce by mandating that she purchase a particular kind 
of health insurance approved by the federal government or pay a penalty for 
noncompliance.  
2. Whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate 
that employers offer employees a particular level of health insurance coverage 
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approved by the government at a price the government determines to be affordable 
or pay a penalty for noncompliance. 
3. Whether Plaintiffs‟ right to free exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment is violated when Congress mandates that citizens purchase health 
insurance with mandated coverage provisions that conflict with their sincerely held 
religious beliefs or pay a penalty, while simultaneously exempting others from the 
same requirement because of their religious opposition.  
4. Whether Plaintiffs‟ right to free exercise of religion under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act is violated when Congress mandates that citizens 
purchase health insurance with mandated coverage provisions that conflict with 
their sincerely held religious beliefs or pay a penalty, while simultaneously 
exempting others from the same requirement because of their religious opposition. 
5. Whether Congress violates the Establishment Clause by exempting 
members of certain religious sects from mandated health insurance but not 
exempting other members of different religious sects solely because they do not 
belong to or adhere to the tenets of  the preferred religious sect.   
6. Whether Congress violates the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause 
by exempting members of certain religious sects from mandated health insurance 
but not exempting other members of different religious sects solely because they 
do not belong to or adhere to the tenets of the preferred religious sect. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs oppose Congress‟ unprecedented attempt to force private citizens 
who have decided not to participate in commerce to engage in commerce by 
mandating that they purchase a particular kind of health insurance approved by the 
federal government or pay a penalty. Plaintiffs also oppose Congress‟ 
unprecedented attempt to force employers to provide a particular level of health 
insurance coverage to all their employees under threat of sanction. Plaintiffs 
challenge provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (the “Act”) as exceeding Congress‟ 
delegated powers under Article I, § 8 and violative of Plaintiffs‟ constitutional and 
statutory rights. Plaintiffs challenge §§ 1501 and 1513 of the Act, which establish 
the “individual mandate” and the “employer mandate.” The individual mandate 
dictates that, with limited exceptions, all citizens obtain health insurance coverage 
that encompasses what the government determines to be “minimum essential 
coverage” or pay significant penalties. Section 1501, 26 U.S.C. §5000A. The 
employer mandate dictates that, with limited exceptions, employers provide 
employees with health insurance coverage that meets what the government 
determines to be “minimum essential coverage” at what the government 
determines is affordable or pay significant penalties. Section 1513, 26 U.S.C. 
§4980H.  
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On the day that the Act became law, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs alleged, inter 
alia, that the individual and employer mandates exceed Congress‟ delegated 
powers under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution, violate Plaintiffs‟ rights to free 
exercise of religion under the First Amendment and RFRA, free speech and free 
association rights under the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Equal 
Protection under the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Guarantee 
Clause, and provisions against direct or capitation taxes. 
Defendants brought motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiffs lacked standing, 
that their claims were not ripe, and that their claims were barred as improper 
challenges to tax collection under the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §7421. 
Defendants further argued that Plaintiffs could not state valid claims on the merits 
because the individual and employer mandate provisions were valid exercises of 
Congress‟ powers under Article I, § 8. Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs could 
not state valid claims for violation of their other constitutional and statutory rights. 
The district court found that Plaintiffs Kathy Byron, Jeff Helgeson and Dr. 
David Stein did not have standing, but found that the remaining plaintiffs, Liberty 
University (“Liberty”), Michele Waddell and Joanne Merrill, had standing. (“Joint 
Appendix,” JA 0158). Only Liberty, Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill are appealing 
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the district court‟s action. On the ripeness issue, the district court found that “the 
challenged provisions create a direct and immediate dilemma, forcing Plaintiffs to 
choose between extensively reorganizing their financial affairs before the 
provisions go into effect, or risking civil penalties, and, thus, Plaintiffs‟ suit was 
not premature. (JA 0159). The Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Plaintiffs‟ claims 
because the penalties imposed upon citizens who do not obtain the required health 
insurance coverage are regulatory penalties, not taxes. (JA 0164). 
The court then reached the merits of all of Plaintiffs‟ claims and dismissed 
them. The court concluded that “Congress acted in accordance with its 
constitutionally delegated powers under the Commerce Clause when it passed the 
employer and individual coverage provisions of the Act.” (JA 0164). Adopting an 
expansive definition of the Commerce Clause, the court held that “decisions to pay 
for health care without insurance are economic activities.” (JA 0171). “I hold that 
there is a rational basis for Congress to conclude that individuals‟ decisions about 
how and when to pay for health care are activities that in the aggregate 
substantially affect the interstate health care market.” (JA 0170). “The conduct 
regulated by the individual coverage provision is also within the scope of 
Congress‟ powers under the Commerce Clause because it is rational to believe the 
failure to regulate the uninsured would undercut the Act‟s larger regulatory scheme 
for the interstate health care market.” (JA 0172). The court held that the employer 
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mandate provision was a logical extension of Congress‟ power to regulate the 
terms and conditions of employment, exemplified in the wage and hour standards 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and similar federal laws. (JA  0173). The court 
reasoned that “the opportunity provided to an employee to enroll in an employer-
sponsored health care plan is a valuable benefit offered in exchange for the 
employee‟s labor, much like a wage or salary,” and from that proposition reasoned 
that it is rational for Congress to mandate that employers provide such insurance 
coverage to employees. (JA 0174).  
The court relied upon its conclusion that the Act was a valid exercise of 
Congress‟ Commerce Clause power to find that Plaintiffs could not state claims 
under the Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause. (JA 0175, 0196). The court 
also dismissed Plaintiffs‟ claims under the First and Fifth Amendments and under 
RFRA. (JA 0177-0195).  
After Plaintiffs filed this appeal, Judge Hudson of the Eastern District of 
Virginia entered summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
reaching the opposite conclusion on the merits to that reached by Judge Moon. 
Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 3:10cv188-HEH, Eastern 
District of Virginia, 2010 WL 5059718 (ED Va. December 13, 2010). Judge 
Hudson concluded that the individual mandate exceeded Congress‟ constitutional 
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authority. The Commonwealth‟s case addressed only the individual mandate, not 
the employer mandate or other constitutional issues Plaintiffs have raised here.  
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Congress is seeking to extend its power far beyond any prior precedent by 
requiring that, with few exceptions, all individuals and all employers of 50 or more 
people obtain and maintain what is termed (but not defined) “minimum essential 
coverage” for themselves and/or their employees. Sections 1501, 1513, 26 U.S.C.  
§§5000A, 4980H. Section 1501 forces individuals who manage their healthcare 
privately and do not participate in the commercial insurance market to participate 
in commerce by obtaining “minimum essential coverage” or paying a penalty. 26 
U.S.C. §5000A. Section 1513 compels employers to participate in commerce by 
obtaining “minimum essential coverage” for their employees or paying a penalty. 
26 U.S.C. §4980H.  
Congress has not defined “minimum essential coverage,” except to say that 
it must at least include ambulatory patient services, emergency services, 
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use 
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment, prescription drug 
coverage, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, 
preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management and  pediatric 
services, including oral and vision care. Section 1302, 42 U.S.C. §18022(b). The 
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precise definition is left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Id.  
Individuals who do not qualify for one of four exceptions and do not have 
“minimum essential coverage” by January 1, 2014 will be subject to a graduated 
annual penalty payable as part of their income tax return. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b), 
(c). The only people exempted from the mandated health insurance (met through 
either private insurance or federal programs such as Medicaid and Medicare) are 
those who are incarcerated, not legally present in the country, or who qualify under 
two limited “religious exemptions.” 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d). The “religious 
exemptions” encompass only (1) members of religious sects which have been in 
existence continually since December 31, 1950 and have conscientious objections 
to acceptance of public or private health insurance or retirement benefits, and (2) 
members of “healthcare sharing ministries,” defined as 501(c)(3) organizations in 
existence since December 31, 1999, which share a common set of ethical or 
religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with 
those beliefs. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). Employers which do not offer “minimum 
essential coverage” to their employees as of January 1, 2014 will pay a penalty 
equal to $2,000 per employee per year if any employee purchases alternative 
coverage and receives a federal tax subsidy. 26 U.S.C. §4980H(a). Even if an 
employer offers “minimum essential coverage” to its employees it can still be 
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subject to a penalty of $3,000 per employee per year if the coverage is not deemed 
“affordable” under the Act, i.e., if any employee receives a federal insurance 
premium subsidy. 26 U.S.C. §4980H(b).  
 The individual and employer mandates are only a small part of the 2,000+ 
page Act which makes comprehensive and fundamental changes to the health care 
and health insurance industries, creates a myriad of new federal bureaucracies and 
institutes new taxes and penalties. Among the other provisions of the Act is a 
requirement that all states establish American Health Benefit Exchanges, which are 
government agencies or non-profit entities created by the state to make “qualified 
health plans” available to “qualified individuals and employers.” Section 1311, 42 
U.S.C. §18031. If states do not demonstrate that they will have exchanges in place 
by January 1, 2014 and that those exchanges will meet the federal standards, then 
the HHS Secretary will establish and operate exchanges in those states. Section 
1321, 42 U.S.C. §18041. States may, but are not required to, prohibit abortion 
coverage in “qualified health plans” offered through exchanges, but can only 
prohibit abortion coverage by enacting a law that is subject to repeal at any time. 
Section 1302, 42 U.S.C. §18022.  
 Liberty is a private Christian university which employs approximately 3,900 
full-time and 1,242 part-time workers. (JA 0018). Approximately 4,340 people are 
covered by various healthcare reimbursement options in which 1,879 Liberty 
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employees have chosen to participate. (JA 0018). Liberty offers healthcare 
reimbursement options that provide the type and level of services that are 
appropriate to its employees‟ personal and financial situations and are consistent 
with Liberty‟s and  its employees‟ Christian values. (JA 0018-0019). The Act 
requires Liberty to have in place no later than January 1, 2014 health insurance 
plans that offer what the government will define as “minimum essential coverage,” 
regardless of whether such coverage provides health care services that are 
necessary or desirable for Liberty‟s employees, affordable for Liberty or its 
employees or compatible with Liberty and its employees‟ Christian values. (JA 
0018-0019). Although Liberty already offers health insurance benefits for its full-
time employees, it will nevertheless assuredly face significant penalties under the 
Act. (JA 0027). Neither Liberty nor its employees can opt out of unnecessary or 
unwanted medical procedures, including procedures that violate their sincerely 
held religious beliefs. (JA 0029-0030). Liberty faces significant financial hardship 
from having to either adjust its health care benefits or pay penalties. (JA 0027). 
 Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill have voluntarily and deliberately decided not 
to purchase health insurance, but to instead save for and privately manage their 
health care. (JA 0019-0021). They are Christians who believe in living out their 
sincerely held religious beliefs in everyday life, including in the lifestyle choices 
they make, of which managing their health care privately is but one example. (JA 
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0029-0030). Because of the individual mandate provisions, Miss Waddell and Mrs. 
Merrill are faced with either paying for “minimum essential coverage” that is 
unnecessary and undesirable or paying penalties. (JA 0029-0030). When the 
provision becomes fully effective on January 1, 2014, Plaintiffs will be required to 
have in place insurance defined as offering “minimum essential coverage” by the 
government, with no ability to opt out of procedures which violate their sincerely 
held religious beliefs, or paying a significant annual penalty. (JA 0029-0030). 
Plaintiffs therefore face the Hobson‟s choice of paying a penalty or paying for 
something that collides with their sincerely held religious beliefs. (JA 0029-0030).  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The irresolvable dilemmas posed by the individual and employer mandates 
coupled with the unprecedented expansion of the Commerce Clause to forcibly 
reverse personal decisions to not participate in commerce create real and 
substantial threats not only to Plaintiffs‟ constitutional rights, but to the liberty of 
all Americans. The district court reached far beyond the outermost boundary of the 
Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause precedents and crafted an expansive definition 
of congressional power that, if permitted to stand, will create an unconstitutional 
national police power that would threaten all aspects of American life. The district 
court‟s willingness to expand the Commerce Clause as Congress suggested 
threatens not only Plaintiffs‟ constitutional rights, but the bedrock concepts of 
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federalism and individual freedom upon which the nation was founded. The 
Founders explicitly withheld a national police power from Congress, reserving that 
power to the states and the people under the Tenth Amendment. United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected 
Congress‟ attempts to assume such power, id., and the district court should have 
done so here. None of the cases cited by the district court change that conclusion or 
justify the sweeping re-definition of congressional power necessary to justify the 
individual and employer mandates.  
Neither can the mandates be justified as valid exercises of Congress‟ power 
under the Necessary and Proper or General Welfare clauses. Those clauses do not 
provide Congress with carte blanche to enact laws that are otherwise outside of 
their enumerated powers. United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) 
(Alito, J., concurring). Rather than enacting a law in furtherance of its enumerated 
powers, Congress entered into new territory and assumed a level of power for 
which there is no prior precedent. Florida v. United States Dep’t. of Health and 
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010). Congress explicitly 
enacted the payments for non-compliance with the mandates as penalties, not 
taxes, and exempted them from the usual enforcement mechanisms available for 
the non-payment of taxes. 26 U.S.C. §5000A. Consequently, Defendants cannot 
now claim that the penalties are taxes enacted under the General Welfare Clause. 
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None of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I §8 give it the authority to 
enact the expansive, intrusive mandates.  
The mandates also trample upon Plaintiffs‟ free exercise rights under both 
the First Amendment and RFRA by forcing them to either engage in a commercial 
transaction that conflicts with their religious beliefs or pay a punitive penalty. 
Adopting an improperly narrow view of Plaintiffs‟ claims, the district court 
erroneously concluded that the individual and employer mandates impose no 
burden on Plaintiffs‟ religious exercise. The district court disregarded the threat 
posed by compelling Plaintiffs to purchase government-approved health insurance 
coverage that collides with their sincerely held religious beliefs or pay a penalty. 
That real and substantial threat places Plaintiffs in the kind of dilemma – choosing 
between their religious beliefs or complying with a government mandate – that the 
Supreme Court has rejected. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
Despite the presence of individualized exemptions and a gerrymander of some but 
not all religious viewpoints, the district court concluded that the mandates were 
neutral laws of general applicability that satisfied the rational basis test. However, 
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the mandates are neither neutral nor 
generally applicable and must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, which they fail to 
satisfy. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
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The “religious exemptions” to the insurance mandates grant differential and  
preferential treatment to certain religious denominations in violation of both the 
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection. The district court failed to follow 
precedent when it improperly dismissed Plaintiffs‟ claims of violation of the 
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection. This Court should reverse the district 
court‟s ruling and find that the individual and employer mandates are 
unconstitutional.  
ARGUMENT 
I.    STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6), Duckworth v. State Administration Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F. 3d 769, 
772 (4th Cir. 2003), accepts the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and 
construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived from therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Chisholm v. Transouth Financial Corp., 95 F.3d 
331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996). A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if Plaintiffs 
have alleged enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiffs have exceeded those 
standards. See, id. (factual allegation must “nudge” a plaintiff‟s claims over the 
line from being merely possible to plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 
1951 (2009) (same).  
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This Court also applies de novo review to claims that a federal statute is 
unconstitutional. U.S. v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 492 (4th Cir. 2006). Questions of law 
or mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 
277, 299-202 (1992) (O‟Connor, J. concurring). Where, as here, a decision 
prejudices constitutional rights, de novo review is particularly appropriate since a 
court‟s decision that substantially burdens fundamental rights should not be 
accorded deference. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 642 (1993) (Stevens, J. 
concurring).  
De novo review here reveals that the individual and employer mandate 
provisions upheld by the district court must be reversed. The Supreme Court has 
never extended the Commerce Clause as far as the district court did in this case. 
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 
1 (2005), discussed infra. This extraordinary expansion of Congress‟ enumerated 
powers should not be given deferential review. 
II. DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES 
 
After finding that Plaintiffs Liberty, Waddell and Merrill had standing, that 
their claims were ripe for adjudication, and not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 
the district court proceeded to evaluate the merits, not merely the sufficiency of the 
factual allegations. (JA 0164-0197). The court went beyond its limited role under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of merely examining the allegations on their face to determine 
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whether they state a plausible claim. Duckworth, 332 F. 3d at 772. The court 
examined congressional reports, correspondence and other federal statutes to 
determine the substantive merit of Plaintiffs‟ claims. (JA 0164-0197). The court 
effectively transformed the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 
669, 671 (1972) (per curiam).
1
 The district court did not leave open the possibility 
of amending the Complaint or remanding the case for further consideration. The 
court ruled that Congress acted within its powers under Art. I §8 and did not 
violate Plaintiffs‟ constitutional and statutory rights. Consequently, the central 
issue of this case–whether the challenged provisions of the Act comport with the 
Constitution–is squarely presented for this Court‟s determination. This court can, 
and should, address the underlying merits of the case.  
A. The District Court Erred When It Determined That The 
Mandates Are Proper Exercises Of Congress’ Authority Under 
The Commerce Clause.  
 
The cornerstone upon which Congress built the Act and the district court 
based its decision is an unprecedented, expansive definition of Congress‟ authority 
                                           
1
  Even if the underlying ruling were regarded as the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment instead of a motion to dismiss, this Court would still not apply 
a deferential standard of review. A district court‟s order of summary judgment is 
independently reviewable by the Court of Appeals. Sarfati v. Wood Holly 
Associates, 874 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989). Where, as here, there are no 
disputed issues of material fact, this Court must determine whether the district 
court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment. Id. 
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under Article I, §8, and particularly its power under the Commerce Clause. (JA 
0169). The district court concluded that “Congress acted in accordance with its 
constitutionally delegated powers under the Commerce Clause when it passed the 
employer and individual coverage provisions of the Act,” effectively slamming the 
door on any challenges to the sweeping and extensive intrusion into Plaintiffs‟ 
private lives and operations. (JA 0164). If Congress can redefine inactivity as 
activity and force individuals who have chosen not to participate in commerce to 
participate in commerce, then Congress can force every American to buy a General 
Motors vehicle in order to prevent the demise of GM because transportation is 
essential to the American way of life. Or, Congress could force every American to 
buy domestically grown vegetables to prop up the local economy under the 
rationale that eating vegetables is more healthful than fast food and will lower 
healthcare costs while simultaneously infusing cash into domestic businesses. The 
implications of the court‟s opinion are staggering.  
1. The individual mandate far exceeds the limitations the 
Supreme Court has placed upon Congress’ authority 
under the Commerce Clause.  
Eschewing the most relevant and controlling precedents of United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 
the district court claimed “that decisions to pay for health care without insurance 
are economic activities follows from the Supreme Court‟s rulings in Wickard [v. 
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Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)] and [Gonzales v.] Raich, [545 U.S. 1 (2005)]” (JA 
0171). Together, Wickard and Raich teach that Congress has broad power to 
regulate purely local matters that have substantial economic effects, even where 
the regulated individuals claim not to participate in interstate commerce.” (JA 
0169). Neither Wickard nor Raich, nor any other Supreme Court precedent, 
supports the district court‟s conclusion.  
a.  Raich does not support the district court’s expansive re-
definition of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. 
The flaw in the district court‟s reliance upon Raich is its failure to recognize 
that the Raich plaintiffs did not challenge Congress‟ authority to enact the 
underlying statute under the Commerce Clause. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15 The Raich 
plaintiffs agreed that passage of the Controlled Substances Act was within 
Congress‟ Commerce Clause power, and did not challenge any of the act‟s 
provisions as outside of the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. Instead, they 
argued that the act‟s categorical prohibition on the manufacture and possession of 
marijuana exceeded Congress‟ Commerce Clause power only when applied to 
California-based manufacture and possession of medical marijuana because those 
uses were legal in California. Id. Unlike here, there was no dispute that the 
regulated class of activities–manufacturing, growing, possessing and/or selling 
illegal drugs–was within the reach of Congress‟ power under the Commerce 
Clause. Id. at 23. That being the case, the Court could not do what the plaintiffs 
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requested–excise individual provisions from the law in order to permit them to 
continue growing and possessing medical marijuana. Id.  
In this case, the district court attempted to apply that finding in Raich to 
Plaintiffs‟ claims regarding the mandates. (JA 0172). However, the analogy fails 
since Raich dealt with plaintiffs who did not dispute Congress‟ authority to enact 
the underlying statute. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. Here, by contrast, Congress‟ 
authority to pass the Act is the central issue. Plaintiffs‟ claims are built upon the 
proposition that Congress exceeded its delegated powers under Art. I §8 when it 
approved the Act, and, in particular, the mandates. (JA 0012-0050). The Raich 
court‟s analysis of an as-applied challenge to an indisputably proper exercise of 
Congress‟ authority is inapposite and cannot “dictate the result in the present 
matter,” as the district court claims. (JA 0167).  
Even if the plaintiffs in Raich had brought a facial challenge to the power of 
Congress to reach their acts of growing and possessing medical marijuana, the 
Raich case would still not apply here because Raich involved voluntary activity, 
whereas the Act regulates voluntary inactivity. The distinction between activity and 
inactivity is critical. The plaintiffs in Raich could avoid Congress‟ reach by not 
manufacturing or possessing marijuana, but here the Plaintiffs cannot avoid 
Congress‟ reach even if they are not doing anything. Raich does not represent a 
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broadening of Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority sufficient to encompass the 
sweeping and intrusive mandate provisions in the Act. 
Raich is not a sea change from the limitations placed upon Congress‟ 
Commerce Clause authority in Lopez and Morrison back to the expansive 
definition in Wickard, 317 U.S. 111. Therefore it cannot be used to shore up the 
district court‟s expansive re-definition of the Commerce Clause. 
b. Wickard does not support the district court’s conclusion 
that private economic decisions can be regulated under 
the Commerce Clause.  
Even the broadened view in Wickard does not provide a foundation upon 
which the district court can build its new expansive definition of congressional 
power. According to the district court, “[t]he conclusion that decisions to pay for 
health care without insurance are economic activities follows from the Supreme 
Court‟s rulings in Wickard and Raich.” (JA 0171). Implicit in that statement is the 
leap of logic that a decision not to engage in economic activity is the same as 
actions taken to produce a crop. In other words, inactivity is the same as activity. 
According to the court‟s analysis, whether Miss Waddell or Mrs. Merrill bought or 
declined insurance is the same thing, and whether they acted or refused to act is not 
meaningfully significant. Under the court‟s definition, Congress can regulate them 
because they are legal citizens who merely exist. Mr. Filburn‟s decision to sow 23 
acres and harvest more than 400 bushels of wheat, Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114, 
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would become irrelevant because Congress could regulate Mr. Filburn even if he 
did not grow and harvest wheat. Yet, it was the fact that Mr. Filburn actively grew 
wheat beyond the quota, even if for personal use, that was significant in Wickard. 
Congress could not have forced Mr. Filburn to grow wheat, but that is exactly what 
the Act does in this case by forcing individuals to buy insurance. 
Critical to the Court‟s conclusion in Wickard, and missing in this case, is the 
fact that the wheat was planted, cultivated and harvested by Mr. Filburn, id., and it 
was that activity that constituted economic activity. By contrast, Miss Waddell and 
Mrs. Merrill have exerted no effort and used no resources. (JA 0019-0021). Mr. 
Filburn was voluntarily and actively participating in the agricultural industry; 
Plaintiffs have done nothing. Wickard merely expanded the type of economic 
activity over which Congress had authority, id., and this is the outer limits of that 
authority. Wickard did not convert inactivity into activity. It did not give Congress 
authority over inactivity. (JA 0170-0172). Mr. Filburn could have avoided the 
reach of Congress by not acting; Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill can never avoid 
the reach of Congress under the district court‟s reasoning.  The district court blazed 
a new trail into the private economic decisions of law-abiding citizens. No 
Supreme Court case has trod this lonely path and it would be dangerous to our 
liberty to do so.  
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c. Lopez and Morrison illustrate how the district court’s 
decision contradicts the Supreme Court’s restrained 
approach to Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.  
Far less shocking attempts by Congress to regulate private gun ownership 
and criminal sentencing in Lopez and Morrison were rejected by the Supreme 
Court, and in Morrison, also rejected by this Court. Brzonkala v. Virginia 
Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) affirmed sub nom. 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The mandates are more troubling 
than were the provisions struck down in Lopez and Morrison since those statutes 
were at least aimed at actions taken by individuals, i.e., obtaining a firearm and 
possessing it near a school and engaging in criminal conduct against a woman, 
while the mandates are aimed at people who have not taken any action. If the 
statutes in Lopez and Morrison were outside of Congress‟ authority, then the 
mandates are even more so.  
 In overturning Congress‟ attempt to use the Commerce Clause to prohibit 
the possession of firearms near local schools, the Lopez Court emphasized the 
importance of limiting Congress‟ enumerated powers to protect fundamental 
liberties. 514 U.S. at 552. As Defendants did in this case, the government 
defendants in Lopez presented a chain of events that they claimed brought 
possession of a firearm in a school zone under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 563. 
The government argued that possessing a firearm in a school zone might result in 
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violence which might affect the national economy by spreading costs throughout 
the population, reducing travel and threatening productivity by threatening the 
learning environment. Id. Lopez said, “if we were to accept the Government‟s 
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate.” Id. at 564. “To uphold the Government‟s 
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States,” something the Court was 
unwilling to do. Id. at 566-568.  
 In Morrison, the Court built upon Lopez to overturn a portion of the 
Violence Against Women Act which instituted a civil remedy for female victims of 
violent crime. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. As in Lopez, the Morrison Court rejected 
the argument that a remote chain of inferences can justify the regulation of non-
economic activity. Id. at 607. “Lopez emphasized . . . that even under our modern, 
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress‟ regulatory authority 
is not without effective bounds.” Id. at 608. “[T]hus far in our Nation‟s history our 
cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where 
that activity is economic in nature.” Id. at 613 (emphasis added). “Gender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity.” Id. As it did in Lopez, the Court expressed concern for the potential 
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effects of enlarging Congress‟ Commerce Clause powers as suggested by the 
government. Id. at 615. “Petitioners‟ reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress 
to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as 
well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate 
effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is 
undoubtedly significant.” Id. at 615-616. “We accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the 
conduct‟s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 617. 
 Simply because Congress stated that the total incidence of decisions against 
purchasing health insurance has a substantial impact on the national market for 
health care does not, as the district court believes, make it so. (JA 0171) Id.; Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 557 n.2. “Under our written Constitution . . . the limitation of 
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.” Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 616.  
If the district court‟s view of the Commerce Clause were true, then Congress 
could force those who dislike vegetables to purchase and consume them using the 
rationale that everyone has to eat, and vegetables are more healthful than fast food. 
There are some things Congress simply cannot do. The mandates are beyond the 
power of Congress. Neither Wickard, Raich, Morrison nor Lopez support the 
court‟s expansive re-definition of the Commerce Clause.  
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2. The Trial Court Erred When It Held That The 
Employer Mandate Is Valid Under The Commerce 
Clause. 
The district court also expansively redefined “wages” when it concluded that 
the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to mandate that employers 
provide health insurance coverage to their employees. (JA 0174). Comparing the 
mandate provision to minimum wage and hour laws, the district court concluded 
that “the opportunity provided to an employee to enroll in an employer-sponsored 
health care plan is a valuable benefit offered in exchange for the employee‟s labor, 
much like a wage or salary.” (JA0174). The district court found that “the employer 
coverage requirement is more accurately described as regulating of the terms of the 
employment contract.” (JA 0174). The court said that employers are already 
engaged in commerce and the fact that they will need to arrange with third party 
insurers to offer coverage to their employees “is of no consequence.” (JA 0174). 
The court did not explain how mandating that private employers enter into a 
contract with other private parties for a particular product to benefit employees has 
no consequences for employers. The district court did not explain how such a third 
party contract can be likened to minimum wage laws that the Supreme Court has 
found permissible as a means of preventing unfair competition and labor strikes. 
See, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 10    Date Filed: 01/18/2011    Page: 35
26 
 
Standards Act “FLSA”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)).   
The district court cited Darby and Jones & Laughlin, but then incorrectly 
expanded their holdings to include not merely minimum wages and hours, but all 
of the terms and conditions of employment. (JA 0173). Utilizing that expansive 
misinterpretation of Darby and Jones & Laughlin, the court concluded that “a 
rational basis exists for Congress to conclude that the terms of health coverage 
offered by employers to their employees have substantial effects cumulatively on 
interstate commerce.” (JA 0174). However, Darby and Jones & Laughlin do not 
support this conclusion. In both cases, the Supreme Court carefully discussed the 
interplay between the challenged provisions and interstate commerce. Darby, 312 
U.S. at 115; Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31. The Court was concerned about the 
effects of strikes on the movement of goods and services and the effects of 
underpaying workers and cutting prices on competition, and on those bases found 
that the wage and hour laws comported with the Commerce Clause. Jones & 
Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31; Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Neither case supports the district 
court‟s proposition that all aspects of the employment relationship can be subject 
to Congress‟ control. 
 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court was careful to qualify its conclusion that the 
NLRA was a valid exercise of Congress‟ Commerce Clause authority in a way that 
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is fatal to the district court‟s conclusion here. 301 U.S. at 31. The Court noted that 
the definitions of “commerce” and “affecting commerce” were carefully drafted to 
complement Congress‟ authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. “Commerce” 
was defined to include only interstate and foreign commerce, and “affecting 
commerce” was defined as “„in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce 
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute 
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.‟” Id.  
This definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion. The grant of 
authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the relationship 
between all industrial employees and employers. Its terms do not 
impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects 
upon interstate or foreign commerce. It purports to reach only what 
may be deemed to burden or obstruct that commerce and, thus 
qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the exercise of 
control within constitutional bounds.  
Id. (emphasis added). “The act does not compel agreements between employers 
and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.” Id. at 45. (emphasis 
added). “The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the 
employer to select its employees or to discharge them.” Id. By contrast, the 
employer mandate does compel employers to provide health insurance or pay a 
penalty. Section 1513, 26 U.S.C. §4980H. It mandates that private employers enter 
into agreements with other private businesses to provide health insurance dictated 
by the government. Id. 
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 The employer mandate is also dissimilar to the wage and hours laws found 
constitutional in Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. As was true of the laws validated in Jones 
& Laughlin, the standards upheld in Darby did not intrude into all aspects of the 
employment relationship. Id. Instead, the challenged provisions were carefully 
worded to prohibit only the shipment of goods in interstate commerce which were 
produced by workers who were not paid at least a minimum wage and were 
required to work more than a maximum number of permitted hours per week. Id. at 
110. Unlike the provisions at issue here, the wage and hour provisions in Darby 
applied only to employees who produced goods to be used in interstate commerce 
and did not prescribe what must be contained within the employment contract, 
other than setting a floor for wages and a ceiling for hours. Id. The Court found 
that the law “is thus directed at the suppression of a method or kind of competition 
in interstate commerce which it has in effect condemned as „unfair.‟” Id. at 122.  
By contrast, the mandates are not targeted to address only particular anti-
competitive conduct that will adversely affect interstate commerce, but are 
expansive regulations of the intimate details of the employer-employee 
relationship. Congress is not merely setting parameters within which those who 
want to engage in interstate commerce can operate, but is mandating that all those 
who employ other people in any type of endeavor must contract with a private 
party to provide a government-defined product at a government-defined price to 
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their employees or pay penalties. 26 U.S.C. §4980H. The Supreme Court has not 
permitted Congress to intrude that far into the employer-employee relationship.  
Congress‟ efforts to protect the integrity of the national economy through 
targeted statutes aimed at preventing the violation of employees‟ rights while 
protecting employers‟ rights, exemplified by the laws in Jones & Laughlin and 
Darby, are a far cry from Congress‟ efforts here. Rather that acting to prevent 
abuses that could adversely affect the flow of commerce, Congress is interfering 
with the flow of business by compelling employers to transact business with third 
parties. Under that logic, Congress could compel employers to offer employees 
expense accounts, company cars, or any other perquisites it deems valuable in 
exchange for labor. That scenario far exceeds the boundaries of Congress‟ power 
established in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, and even the 
definition of commerce in Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-129.  
3. The trial court’s finding that the mandates are 
reasonable extensions of Congress’ enumerated powers 
contradicts the foundational principle that Congress’ 
enumerated powers are to be exercised within the 
boundaries of federalism. 
 
The district court utterly disregarded the dual system of government set forth 
by the Founders. “[E]ven [our] modern-era precedents which have expanded 
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congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is 
subject to outer limits.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.  
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court was careful to explain that its holding 
was limited. 301 U.S. at 37. The Court warned that the scope of the interstate 
commerce power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of 
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and 
what is local and create a completely centralized government.” Id. That is precisely 
what will happen if the district court‟s decision stands. Congress will have 
obtained the right to intrude upon the private decisions of individuals and 
employers, to force them to buy or provide a product, and to mandate the details of 
that product.  
If Congress is permitted to force individuals to purchase health insurance of 
a particular type at a particular price, it will be “difficult to perceive any limitation 
on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States historically have been sovereign.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.    
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote: “The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments 
are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. 
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Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of 
authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our 
fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 
S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce 
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid. 
 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. The Founders deliberately withheld from Congress “a 
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation. 
See Art. I, § 8.” Id. at 566. “[W]e always have rejected readings of the Commerce 
Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a 
police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.” 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 When analyzing a challenge to Congress‟ exercise of an enumerated power, 
the court‟s task is to understand and apply “the framework set forth in the 
Constitution.” United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). “The question 
is not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact 
have been given by the people.” Id. Nevertheless, the district court re-wrote those 
parameters by upholding the mandates. The conclusion by the district court is 
antithetical to the Constitution. 
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4. The trial court erred in equating the mandate 
provisions with Congress’ regulation of the business of 
health insurance.  
The district court also mistakenly characterized the mandate provisions as 
merely a further example of Congress exercising its power to regulate the business 
of health insurance. Congress cited to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as authority for the mandate provision. Section 
1501(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(3). The district court cited South-Eastern 
Underwriters, and compared the mandate provisions to Medicare, the Employee 
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), and Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) (JA 0176). As is true about the district 
court‟s analysis of Supreme Court precedent, its attempt to analogize Congress‟ 
intrusion into the private lives of law-abiding citizens to its regulation of certain 
aspects of the insurance industry fails.  
In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court confirmed that the 
insurance industry is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. South-
Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553. The plaintiffs in South-Eastern 
Underwriters challenged indictments charging violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, claiming that insurance was not subject to the Sherman Act or Congress‟ 
power over interstate commerce. Id. at 536. The Supreme Court rejected both 
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contentions. Id. at 552-553. “No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts 
its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory 
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of 
the business of insurance.” Id. at 553. Congress‟ “power to determine the rules of 
intercourse across state lines was essential to weld a loose confederacy into a 
single, indivisible nation; its continued existence is equally essential to the welfare 
of that nation.” Id. at 552. But, the authority to regulate aspects of the insurance 
industry does not grant Congress the power to dictate that all citizens participate by 
either purchasing government-defined policy or paying a penalty. Regulating an 
interstate industry to protect against anti-competitive or other injurious conduct is 
one thing; demanding participation in the industry is quite another. Congress‟ 
enactment of ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA and similar laws are examples of the 
former, not the latter. Notably, in those enactments, unlike the Act here, Congress 
made clear that it was not interfering with individual freedom. Those laws 
permitting some federal regulation of the insurance industry are inapposite to the 
Act and the mandates. Insurance companies and employers are only regulated if 
they chose to enter into the insurance market by either insuring or offering 
insurance. Neither insurance companies nor employers are forced to insure or offer 
insurance. Here, however, the Act forces employers to offer a government-defined 
insurance program at the level and cost set by the government. Moreover, none of 
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the laws relied on by the district court regulate individuals per se, and none of them 
force individuals to buy insurance. Here, the Act forces unwilling individuals to 
purchase a government-defined health insurance package. Being forced into the 
market is critically different than being regulated after one voluntarily participates 
in the market. 
Congress emphasized the continuing importance of individual liberties when 
it enacted what became known as Medicare in 1965.  
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal 
officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are 
provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer 
or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health 
services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the 
administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person. 
 
42 U.S.C. §1395. Congress was explicit about its concern regarding individual 
freedom in what became 42 U.S.C. §1395a, stating: “Basic freedom of choice-Any 
individual entitled to insurance benefits under this subchapter may obtain health 
services from any institution, agency, or person qualified to participate under this 
subchapter if such institution, agency, or person undertakes to provide him such 
services.” In the Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled Act (Medicare), 
Congress did not attempt to override the will of individuals or employers and 
compel participation under penalty. The mandate provisions are not merely a 
natural extension of Medicare. Individuals may choose to not take Medicare and 
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doctors may choose not to accept Medicare patients. By contrastr, the Act forces 
individuals to obtain insurance and employers to provide it.    
Similarly, when it enacted ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq., Congress was 
cognizant of the voluntary nature of employee pension plan benefits. H.R. Rep. 93-
533 on Public Law 93-406 1974 USCCAN 4639. Congress enacted ERISA to 
protect the interests of participants in existing employee benefit plans. Yates v. 
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). ERISA established reporting requirements, vesting 
and funding standards and fiduciary obligations to protect employees‟ investments 
in pension plans, and, in particular, to protect employees from losses when pension 
plans are under funded. Id. at 6-7. Congress was clear that it wanted to encourage 
employers to offer these plans to employees, but that employers and employees 
retained their freedom to make decisions regarding the plans. 1974 USCCAN at 
4647. Unlike the mandate provisions here, ERISA does not compel employers to 
offer such plans, nor employees to participate in them. Instead, as is true with other 
Commerce Clause legislation, ERISA regulates those who have voluntarily 
engaged in an activity or entered into an agreement. Employers do not have to 
create and offer pension plans, but if they decide to, then they will have to comply 
with ERISA. ERISA is unlike the mandates established under the Act and does not 
support the district court‟s finding that the Act is a valid exercise of Congress‟ 
enumerated powers.  
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In Title X of COBRA Congress instituted standards to protect employees 
who voluntarily agreed to participate in group health plans that their employers 
voluntarily agreed to offer. Public L. No. 99-272, §§ 10001-10003 (1986), 100 
Stat. 82, The relevant provisions in COBRA provide that an employee must be 
permitted to continue participating in the group health insurance program for a 
period of time after the employment ends. Id. at § 10001(c). COBRA provides that 
if an employer decides to no longer offer group health plans to its employees, then 
the continuation provisions in COBRA no longer apply. Id. In other words, 
employers retain their freedom to not offer or discontinue offering employee health 
insurance benefits. Id. As is true with ERISA, COBRA contains provisions that 
regulate employers who have voluntarily agreed to provide group health plan 
benefits and benefit employees who have voluntarily agreed to participate in the 
plans. Id. If either party decides to no longer participate in the program, then no 
one is compelled to do so. Id. COBRA does not support the proposition that 
Congress can use its authority under the Commerce Clause to compel employers to 
offer group health plans and employees to participate in them, as the district court 
implies. (JA 0176).  
HIPAA also does not support the district court‟s conclusion that the mandate 
provisions are a natural extension of Congress‟ regulation of the health insurance 
industry. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in various sections 
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beginning with 42 U.S.C. §300gg). As is true with ERISA and COBRA, HIPAA 
does not mandate that companies or individuals participate in the health insurance 
industry, but regulates companies which have voluntarily agreed to offer health 
insurance to individuals and groups. See id., Title I, 110 Stat. at 1939-1991. No 
individual or organization is compelled to offer or purchase health insurance 
against his/its will. Id. Instead, organizations that want to provide health insurance 
coverage to others must agree, as a part of engaging in that business, to abide by 
certain rules and regulations sent forth in HIPAA. Id. Unlike the Act here, HIPAA 
does not demand that companies either partake in the health insurance industry or 
pay punitive sanctions.  
Far from merely being a logical extension of Congress‟ authority to regulate 
the insurance industry, the mandate provisions are a giant leap into uncharted 
territory. Congress is attempting to move from regulating voluntary conduct that 
affects the national economy to managing private decisions and even inactivity. 
Congress is attempting to extend its reach from economic activities to non-
economic non-activities and to regulate personal decision making. The intrusive 
and expansive power exemplified in the mandates is without precedent. 
B. The Mandates Exceed Congress’ Authority Under The 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority 
to pass laws in furtherance of its constitutionally-enumerated powers, its authority 
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is not unbridled. Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *10.
 2
 The 
Necessary and Proper Clause only permits Congress to enact laws that are 
authorized by one of its enumerated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
405, 421 (1819). “As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo, „Congress has 
plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, ... 
so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional 
restriction.‟” Id. at 9 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)). In other 
words, the Necessary and Proper Clause “does not give Congress carte blanche,” 
but must be premised upon an existing enumerated power. United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).  
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in McCulloch, “„[l]et the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.‟” 
Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *10 (quoting McCulloch, 17 
U.S. at 421). Citing that language from McCulloch, the Comstock Court described 
the means-end test that should be used to determine whether Congress has 
exceeded its authority. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956. “[I]n determining whether the 
                                           
2
   The district court did not reach the question of whether the mandates are 
valid under the Necessary and Proper or General Welfare Clause. U.S. Const., art I 
§ 8, cl. 18, 1. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a 
particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means 
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.” Id. Since there is no constitutionally enumerated power upon which 
Congress could base its attempt to compel Americans to engage in commerce or 
pay a penalty, the analysis will necessarily result in a finding that the mandates 
exceed Congress‟ power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
This conclusion is further borne out by Judge Vinson‟s observations 
regarding the nature of the mandates. Florida v. United States Dep’t. of Health and 
Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010). “The Commerce 
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause have never been applied in such a manner 
before.” Id. “The power that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply 
without prior precedent.” Id.  
The Congressional Research Service (a nonpartisan legal „think tank‟ 
that works exclusively for Congress and provides analysis on the 
constitutionality of pending legislation) advised Congress on July 24, 
2009, long before the Act was passed into law, that „it is unclear 
whether the [Commerce Clause] would provide a solid constitutional 
foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have health 
insurance.” The analysis goes on to state that the individual mandate 
presents “the most challenging question ... as it is a novel issue 
whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to 
purchase a good or service.” Congressional Research Service, 
Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional 
Analysis, July 24, 2009, at 3. 
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Clearly, Congress was not relying upon existing precedent or an enumerated power 
when it enacted the mandates. Since the mandates are not authorized by an Article 
I §8 power they cannot be valid.  
C. The Mandates Are Not Valid Exercises of Congress’ 
Authority Under The General Welfare Clause. 
The Taxing and Spending or General Welfare Clause does not vest Congress 
with the authority to enact the mandates. The Supreme Court has long held that 
Congress cannot enact a tax to indirectly regulate what it cannot directly regulate 
under its enumerated powers. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 30, 37 (1922) 
(citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423). Congress cannot use the penalty provision in 
Sections 1501 and 1513 to compel individuals and employers to purchase 
government-approved health insurance policies when Congress cannot otherwise 
compel such conduct under the Commerce Clause.  
Congress has made it clear that the penalties under Sections 1501 and 1513 
are just that–penalties–and not taxes, and the Defendants cannot ignore that intent 
to posture its last minute litigation tactic. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 
(1903). A provision will not be regarded as a tax if it “clearly appears” that 
Congress did not intend to enact a tax. Id. at  613.  
Congress referred to the payments as “penalties,” not “taxes,” while using 
the term “taxes” elsewhere in the Act. Compare Section 1501(b), 26 U.S.C. 
§5000A(b) (“penalty”), with Sections 9001, 26 U.S.C. § 4980I (a) (“excise tax” on 
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high cost employer-sponsored health coverage), 9007(b), 26 U.S.C. §4959  
(“excise tax” on failure to meet hospital exemption requirements), and Section 
10907, 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (“excise tax” on indoor tanning services). Although the 
noncompliance penalties were added to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress 
specifically exempted them from the criminal penalties, liens and levies imposed 
upon nonpayment of taxes, because they were not to be regarded as taxes. Section 
1501(g)(2), 26 U.S.C. §5000A(g)(2). Congress did not identify any revenue-
generating purposes for the payments, which is required for imposition of a tax. 
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 
841 (1995) (a “tax” as used in the Constitution is an exaction for support of the 
government). Congress relied exclusively upon the Commerce Clause in its 
findings. Section 1501(a), 42 U.S.C. §18091. From these factors it “clearly 




The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intentionally changed 
the terminology from “tax” to “penalty.” Each of the earlier versions of the bill in 
                                           
3
  This conclusion is further supported by public statements made by President 
Obama, the Act‟s chief proponent.: “For us to say you have to take responsibility 
to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase,” and “Nobody considers 
that a tax increase.” http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/20/ 
obama.health.care/index.html (last visited January 11, 2011).  
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both the House of Representatives and the Senate used the term “tax” when 
referring to the assessment for noncompliance with the insurance mandate, as 
explained by Judge Hudson and, in greater detail by Judge Vinson in Florida v. 
HHS, 716 F. Supp. 2d at  1133:   
For example, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009” 
(H.R. 3200) was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 
14, 2009. Like the Act, it contained an individual mandate and 
concomitant penalty. However, it called the penalty a tax. Section 401 
was unambiguously titled “Tax on Individuals Without Acceptable 
Health Care Coverage,” and went on to refer to the exaction as a “tax” 
no less than fourteen times in that section alone. See, e.g., id. 
(providing that with respect to “any individual who does not meet the 
requirements of subsection (d) at any time during the taxable year, 
there is hereby imposed a tax”). H.R. 3200 was thereafter superseded 
by a similar bill, “Affordable Health Care for America Act” (H.R. 
3962), which was actually passed in the House of Representatives on 
November 7, 2009. That second House bill also included an individual 
mandate and penalty, and it repeatedly referred to the penalty as a 
“tax.” See, e.g., Section 501 (providing that for any person who does 
not comply with the individual mandate “there is hereby imposed a 
tax,” and referring to that “tax” multiple times); Section 307(c)(1)(A) 
(further referring to the penalty as a “tax[ ] on individuals not 
obtaining acceptable coverage”). 
 
While the above bills were being considered in the House, the 
Senate was working on its healthcare reform bills as well. On October 
13, 2009, the Senate Finance Committee passed a bill, “America's 
Healthy Future Act” (S. 1796). A precursor to the Act, this bill 
contained an individual mandate and accompanying penalty. In the 
section titled “Excise Tax on Individuals Without Essential Health 
Benefits Coverage,” the penalty was called a “tax.” See Section 1301 
(“If an applicable individual fails to [obtain required insurance] there 
is hereby imposed a tax”). 
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See also, Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 at *9. In the final version 
of the Act enacted by the Senate on December 24, 2009, the term “penalty” was 
substituted for “tax” in Section 1501(b)(1). 26 U.S.C. §5000A. “A logical 
inference can be drawn that the substitution of this critical language was a 
conscious and deliberate act on the part of Congress. Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 
2010 WL 5059718 at *18 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 
(1983)). “Congress‟s conspicuous decision to not use the term “tax” in the Act 
when referring to the exaction (as it had done in at least three earlier incarnations 
of the legislation) is significant. Florida v. HHS, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. “„Few 
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that 
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier 
discarded in favor of other language.‟” Id. at 1134-1135 (citing INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442 (1987)).  
Congress‟ actions and its words clearly communicate that the penalty 
provisions in the individual and employer mandates are penalties, not taxes, and 
therefore could not have been enacted pursuant to Congress‟ power to tax and 
spend for the general welfare under Article I, §8. 
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D. The Mandates Violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Rights By 
Compelling Plaintiffs To Choose Between Their Sincerely 
Held Religious Beliefs And Paying A Penalty.  
 
Despite explicit references to individualized exemptions in the text of the 
Act, the district court concluded that the Act is a neutral law of general 
applicability which survives rational basis review. (JA 0184). The district court‟s 
conclusion is in error. 
1. The Mandates Violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Rights 
Under the First Amendment. 
The district court pointed to the “religious conscience” exemptions in 
Section 1501 as examples of Congress‟ attempt to accommodate religious belief 
instead of efforts to carve out individualized exemptions for particular categories 
of believers. (JA 0184). Relying upon that premise, the district court concluded 
that the Act is a neutral law of general applicability that only incidentally burdens 
religion and is subject only to rational basis review under Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Under Smith, a law which is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if 
the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Id. at 
878. However, if the law contains individualized exemptions, it is not a neutral law 
of general applicability and will not survive a free exercise challenge unless the 
government can establish that it is justified by a compelling interest and narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest. Id. at 884; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
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v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). The “Free Exercise Clause protects 
against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.”  Lukumi, 508 
U.S. at 534. “The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of 
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.” Id. The 
court must look carefully at the exemptions permitted to “protect religious 
observers against unequal treatment.” Id. at 542. Categories of selection are of 
“paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious 
practice.” Id.  
 The Act subjects religious observers such as Plaintiffs to unequal treatment 
and are just the type of “religious gerrymanders” that the Supreme Court warned 
against in Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 542. Section 1501 exempts those who “cannot 
afford coverage,” defined according to a premium to income ratio; those who have 
incomes below 100 percent of the poverty line, members of Indian tribes and those 
whom the Administration determines have suffered a hardship affecting their 
ability to purchase insurance. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e). The exemptions for some, but 
not all, religious beliefs are particularly problematic since they grant preferred 
status only to certain religious adherents. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). The “religious 
conscience” exemption provides that individuals who are members of religious 
sects which have been in existence since December 31, 1950, which have tenets 
against participation in government support programs, and which have 
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demonstrated that they provide care for dependent members are not subject to the 
penalties described in Section 1501. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 
1402). The “health care sharing ministry exemption” provides that people who are 
members of nonprofit organizations in existence continuously since December 31, 
1999 which share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and have since 
December 31, 1999 continuously shared medical expenses among members in 
accordance with those beliefs and without regard to members‟ states of residence 
or employment are not subject to the sanctions imposed by Section 1501. 26 
U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2).  
 Individuals like Plaintiffs must comply but parties who demonstrate 
financial hardship do not. Plaintiffs, who have religious objections to the 
compelled purchase of a prescribed health insurance product, will be subject to 
penalty but those who have similar religious objections will be exempt because 
they are members of specified religious sects. Individuals who share common 
ethical beliefs and would like to share medical expenses, but failed to form an 
organization by December 31, 1999, will be unable to exempt themselves from 
Section 1501‟s requirements, but those who did form an organization by December 
31, 1999 will be exempt. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(2). The Act clearly includes 
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individualized exemptions and a gerrymander of some but not all religious 
viewpoints, and thus strict scrutiny is applicable under Smith.
4
  
 The mandates burden Plaintiffs‟ sincerely held religious beliefs by 
compelling them to obtain health insurance for those medical services that the 
government deems are “minimum essential coverage,” regardless of whether the 
services are essential, affordable or objectionable to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. §5000A. 
Plaintiffs will not be permitted to opt out of paying for medical procedures that 
violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, but will be faced with the choice of 
compromising their religious beliefs or paying a penalty. Id. The district court 
dismissed Plaintiffs‟ assertion of burden by claiming that Plaintiffs‟ only objection 
was to subsidizing abortion and that there allegedly are provisions within the Act 
to protect against such subsidies. (JA 0184-0187). While objection to funding 
abortion is certainly of vital importance to Plaintiffs, it is not the only aspect of the 
Act that burdens Plaintiffs‟ religious beliefs. (JA 0018-0021). Plaintiffs allege that 
being forced to obtain what the government defines as minimum essential 
                                           
4
     Further evidence of the fact that the Act is not generally applicable can be seen 
in exemptions the Department of Health and Human Services has granted to 
relieve companies from some of the other provisions of the Act. For example, as of 
December 3, 2010, 222 companies have been granted one-year waivers of the 
Act‟s annual limit restrictions on health insurance policies. The waivers affect 
more than 1.5 million people. 
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html (last 
visited January 10, 2011).  
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coverage, with no opportunity to opt out, will require that they pay for medical 
procedures even if they are antithetical to their religious beliefs. (JA 0018-0021). 
In addition, Miss Waddell and Mrs. Merrill will be compelled to abandon their 
religious beliefs that they should live their lives so that they provide for their own 
medical needs without relying upon third party insurance companies. (JA 0018-
0021). The Defendants must prove that the provisions are justified by a compelling 
interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. They 
cannot meet that burden.  
 Congress asserts that the mandate provisions are necessary to increase the 
supply of and demand for health care services, increase the number of Americans 
who have health insurance, achieve near-universal health insurance coverage by 
strengthening the employer-based health insurance market, and improve financial 
security for families. 42 U.S.C. § 18091. Improving financial stability by adding 
customers to a large interstate health insurance market is not a compelling interest, 
and the mandates are not narrowly tailored to advance those interests at any rate. 
The mandate provisions will not necessarily increase the number who have health 
insurance or even provide revenue targeted to providing coverage. Section 1501 
says that individuals purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, but the penalty is 
not a revenue generator designed to cover the costs of the uninsured. The Act does 
not specify that revenues realized from the penalties will be used to purchase 
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insurance for those who are uninsured, so the penalties will not advance the goal of 
insuring more individuals. The provisions do not advance the goal of near-
universal coverage since they do not ensure that every uninsured person, or even 
the majority of uninsured people, will have insurance. The mandate provisions will 
not necessarily increase the supply or demand for health insurance or health care 
services since uninsured people will not necessarily become insured. Finally, a 
requirement that families either pay for health insurance that they do not presently 
pay for, adapt their coverage to meet “minimum essential coverage,” presumably at 
a higher cost, or be subject to an increased tax liability does not improve “financial 
security.” Congress‟ intrusion into the private decisions of American citizens does 
not advance the interests asserted in the Act, and therefore the mandates cannot 
withstand strict scrutiny.  
 The relationship between the “religious exemptions” and the asserted 
interests under the Act is even more tenuous. If, as Congress asserts, the goal is to 
increase the number of insureds, then exempting uninsured Americans who belong 
to certain religious organizations does not advance that interest. Even if Congress 
tries to justify the “religious exemptions” by saying that the exempted groups have 
alternative programs that meet the goal of paying for health care needs, it still 
would not explain why only the specified groups have an exemption and similar 
groups do not. Denying Plaintiffs the ability to participate in such an exemption 
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does nothing to advance Congress‟ stated goal of improving the level of coverage 
for health care costs.  
 The mandate provisions are not neutral or generally applicable, impose 
substantial burdens upon Plaintiffs‟ religious beliefs, and are not narrowly tailored 
to advance a compelling state interest. They fail the strict scrutiny test required 
under Smith, 424 U.S. at 884.  
2. The mandates violate Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights 
under RFRA. 
Even if the mandate provisions were found to be laws of general 
applicability, they would still be subject to and fail strict scrutiny under RFRA. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b); see also Gonzales v. O. Centro Espirita Beneficiente 
Uniao de Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). RFRA provides that the government 
cannot substantially burden religious exercise, even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, unless the government can “demonstrat[e] that 
application of the burden to the person–(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b)) 
(emphasis added). RFRA imposes a more demanding strict scrutiny review than 
does the First Amendment under Smith in that it “requires the Government to 
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the 
challenged law „to the person‟–the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of 
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religion is being substantially burdened. Id. at 430-431. Defendants cannot meet 
that burden.  
That is particularly true in light of the fact that the statutory provision 
invalidated in Gonzales, like the mandate provisions here, contained a religious 
exemption that was applied to one religious group but not to the plaintiffs. Id. at 
433-434. In Gonzales, the existing religious exemption in the Controlled 
Substances Act was fatal to the government‟s claim that members of the plaintiff 
church were not entitled to an exemption for their sacramental use of hoasca tea. 
Id. at 433-434. The Court reasoned that if the use of a controlled substance, peyote, 
was permitted for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans under the existing 
religious exemption, then the government could not preclude a similar exception 
for the 130 or so UDV church members who wanted to similarly use a controlled 
substance to practice their faith. Id. at 433. The same is true in this case. If 
exemption from the mandate is permitted for adherents of certain religious sects, 
then Defendants cannot justify precluding followers of other religious traditions 
who object to the mandate. If exemption from the mandate is permitted for 
members of health care sharing ministries established before January 1, 2000, then 
Defendants cannot preclude others who form similar ministries after January 1, 
2000.   
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 “Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct 
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct 
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While 
the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless 
substantial.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Plaintiffs have 
alleged that the Act compels them to either purchase health insurance that collides 
with their religious convictions. (JA 0018-0021, 0029-0030). This places 
substantial pressure upon Plaintiffs to modify their behavior and participate in a 
government-defined system in violation of their religious beliefs. (JA 0019-0021). 
Defendants cannot meet their burden of showing that the provisions are narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The mandates violate RFRA.  
E. The Preferential Treatment Of The Religious Views Of 
Those Who Would Qualify For The Religious 
Exemptions Violates The Establishment Clause. 
The preferential treatment accorded to those who qualify for the “religious 
exemptions” to the mandates violates the “clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause,” i.e., that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). In Larson, the Court noted 
“no State can „pass laws which aid one religion‟ or that „prefer one religion over 
another.‟” Id. at 246 (citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
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“„The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government ... effect 
no favoritism among sects ... and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.‟” 
Id. (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring)). Consequently, “when we are presented with a state law granting a 
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect 
and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” Id.  
The “religious exemptions” in Section 1501 grant preferences to members of 
particular religious sects, i.e. those which have been in existence since December 
31, 1950, have tenets against participation in government support programs, and 
have demonstrated that they provide care for dependent members. 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(d)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 1402. Members of religious denominations which meet 
those criteria do not have to comply with the mandates and will not be subject to 
the penalties for non-compliance. Id. However, Plaintiffs, who are not part of those 
denominations, must comply with the requirements or pay the penalties, placing 
them at a disadvantage for no reason other that they do not belong to the preferred 
religious group. Larson makes clear that the provision is not valid. Larson, 456 
U.S. at 246.  
The district court erred when it applied the test established in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) to find that the exemptions did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. (JA 0178-0183). The Lemon test is intended to apply only to 
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laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions that 
discriminate among religions. Larson, 456 U.S. at 252. Lemon is inapplicable.  
F. The Differential Treatment Accorded To Plaintiffs’ 
Religious Beliefs Violates Equal Protection. 
 Equal protection under the Fifth Amendment requires that all people 
similarly situated be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
Classifications such as the “religious exemptions” in Section 1501 must bear some 
fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. Id. The pertinent inquiry is whether 
the classification advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion. 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981). The classification must have some 
rational basis and the court cannot substitute its personal notions of good public 
policy for those of Congress, id., which is precisely what the district court did.  
 Congress did not explain how exempting certain uninsured people from the 
provisions meet the goals of increasing demand for health insurance, decreasing 
the number of uninsureds, and attaining near universal coverage. 42 U.S.C. 
§18091; 26 U.S.C. §5000A. Congress did not explain how exempting members of 
50-year-old religious sects with member care programs and conscientious 
objections to insurance, but not members of similar sects that are less than 50 years 
old advances its stated goals. Id. Nor did Congress explain how exempting 
members of “healthcare sharing ministries” that are at least 10 years but not 
members of similar ministries that are less than 10 years old advances its 
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legislative goals. Id. The district court devised its own reasons, but did not offer a 
rational basis for the exemptions. (JA 0189-0190). Even if the court‟s explanation 
were true, it would not account for the differentiation based upon the relative ages 
of the religious organizations.  
 Absent a rational basis for the distinctions made in the exemptions, the 
district court should have found that the mandates violate equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
 Congress exceeded its authority under Art. I §8 of the Constitution when it 
enacted the Act, and, particularly, the mandates. The provisions cannot be 
reconciled with Congress‟ limited powers under the Commerce Clause. Nor do the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, or the General Welfare Clause support the Act. The 
mandate provisions also violate Plaintiffs‟ free exercise rights under the First 
Amendment and RFRA, along with the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause. This court should reverse the district court on the merits and declare the 
Act, and particularly the individual and employer mandates unconstitutional. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs request oral argument under F.R.App.P 34 because this case 
addresses issues of first impression and of great constitutional significance, i.e., 
whether Congress has authority to force individuals to buy and employers to 
provide a government approved health insurance product and a government-
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defined price. The Act is an unprecedented extension of congressional authority 
and has far reaching consequence well beyond health insurance.  
The decision below is in conflict with a decision in the Eastern District of 
Virginia on the individual mandate portion of the Act. Commonwealth of Va. v. 
Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718. Therefore, it is particularly important for this court to 
resolve the conflict, and Plaintiffs believe that oral argument will be important in 
that regard. Consequently, Plaintiffs respectfully request oral argument.  
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United States Code Annotated  
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code  
 Subtitle A Income Taxes  
 Chapter 2. Tax on Self-Employment Income  
 § 1402. Definitions 
 
 
(g) Members of certain religious faiths.-- 
 
(1) Exemption.--Any individual may file an application (in such form and 
manner, and with such official, as may be prescribed by regulations under this 
chapter) for an exemption from the tax imposed by this chapter if he is a member 
of a recognized religious sect or division thereof and is an adherent of established 
tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is 
conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public 
insurance which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or 
retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or provides services for, 
medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system established by the 
Social Security Act). Such exemption may be granted only if the application 
contains or is accompanied by-- 
 
(A) such evidence of such individual's membership in, and adherence to the 
tenets or teachings of, the sect or division thereof as the Secretary may require 
for purposes of determining such individual's compliance with the preceding 
sentence, and 
 
(B) his waiver of all benefits and other payments under titles II and XVIII of the 
Social Security Act on the basis of his wages and self-employment income as 
well as all such benefits and other payments to him on the basis of the wages 
and self-employment income of any other person, 
 
and only if the Commissioner of Social Security finds that-- 
 
(C) such sect or division thereof has the established tenets or teachings referred 
to in the preceding sentence, 
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(D) it is the practice, and has been for a period of time which he deems to be 
substantial, for members of such sect or division thereof to make provision for 
their dependent members which in his judgment is reasonable in view of their 
general level of living, and 
 
(E) such sect or division thereof has been in existence at all times since 
December 31, 1950. 
 
An exemption may not be granted to any individual if any benefit or other 
payment referred to in subparagraph (B) became payable (or, but for section 
203 or 222(b) of the Social Security Act, would have become payable) at or 
before the time of the filing of such waiver. 
 
(2) Period for which exemption effective.--An exemption granted to any 
individual pursuant to this subsection shall apply with respect to all taxable years 
beginning after December 31, 1950, except that such exemption shall not apply 
for any taxable year-- 
 
(A) beginning (i) before the taxable year in which such individual first met the 
requirements of the first sentence of paragraph (1), or (ii) before the time as of 
which the Commissioner of Social Security finds that the sect or division 
thereof of which such individual is a member met the requirements of 
subparagraphs (C) and (D), or 
 
(B) ending (i) after the time such individual ceases to meet the requirements of 
the first sentence of paragraph (1), or (ii) after the time as of which the 
Commissioner of Social Security finds that the sect or division thereof of which 
he is a member ceases to meet the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D). 
 
(3) Subsection to apply to certain church employees.--This subsection shall 
apply with respect to services which are described in subparagraph (B) of section 
3121(b)(8) (and are not described in subparagraph (A) of such section). 
 




United States Code Annotated  
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code  
 Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes  
  Chapter 42. Private Foundations; and Certain Other Tax-Exempt 
Organizations  
  Subchapter D. Failure by Certain Charitable Organizations to 
Meet Certain Qualification Requirements  
 
  § 4959. Taxes on failures by hospital organizations 
 
If a hospital organization to which section 501(r) applies fails to meet the 
requirement of section 501(r)(3) for any taxable year, there is imposed on the 
organization a tax equal to $50,000. 
 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code (Refs & Annos) 
  Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes (Refs & Annos) 
  Chapter 43. Qualified Pension, Etc., Plans (Refs & Annos) 
 
  § 4980H. Shared responsibility for employers regarding health coverage 
 
(a) Large employers not offering health coverage.--If-- 
 
(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer to its full-time employees 
(and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential 
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan (as defined in section 
5000A(f)(2)) for any month, and 
 
(2) at least one full-time employee of the applicable large employer has been 
certified to the employer under section 1411 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act as having enrolled for such month in a qualified health 
plan with respect to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing 
reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the employee, 
 
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment equal to the 
product of the applicable payment amount and the number of individuals employed 
by the employer as full-time employees during such month. 




(b) Large employers offering coverage with employees who qualify for 
premium tax credits or cost-sharing reductions.-- 
 
(1) In general.--If-- 
 
(A) an applicable large employer offers to its full-time 
employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in 
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-
sponsored plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any 
month, and 
 
(B) 1 or more full-time employees of the applicable large 
employer has been certified to the employer under section 1411 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as having 
enrolled for such month in a qualified health plan with respect 
to which an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing 
reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the employee, 
 
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment equal to the 
product of the number of full-time employees of the applicable large employer 
described in subparagraph (B) for such month and an amount equal to    1/12 of 
$3,000. 
 
(2) Overall limitation.--The aggregate amount of tax determined under 
paragraph (1) with respect to all employees of an applicable large employer 
for any month shall not exceed the product of the applicable payment 
amount and the number of individuals employed by the employer as full-
time employees during such month. 
 
(3) Special rules for employers providing free choice vouchers.--No 
assessable payment shall be imposed under paragraph (1) for any month 
with respect to any employee to whom the employer provides a free choice 
voucher under section 10108 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act for such month. 
 
(c) Definitions and special rules.--For purposes of this section-- 
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(1) Applicable payment amount.--The term “applicable payment amount” 
means, with respect to any month,    1/12 of $2,000. 
 
(2) Applicable large employer.-- 
 
(A) In general.--The term “applicable large employer” means, with 
respect to a calendar year, an employer who employed an average of 
at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding 
calendar year. 
 
(B) Exemption for certain employers.-- 
 
(i) In general.--An employer shall not be considered to employ 
more than 50 full-time employees if-- 
 
(I) the employer's workforce exceeds 50 full-time 
employees for 120 days or fewer during the calendar 
year, and 
 
(II) the employees in excess of 50 employed during such 
120-day period were seasonal workers. 
 
(ii) Definition of seasonal workers.--The term “seasonal 
worker” means a worker who performs labor or services on a 
seasonal basis as defined by the Secretary of Labor, including 
workers covered by section 500.20(s)(1) of title 29, Code of 
Federal Regulations and retail workers employed exclusively 
during holiday seasons. 
 
(C) Rules for determining employer size.--For purposes of this 
paragraph-- 
 
(i) Application of aggregation rule for employers.--All persons 
treated as a single employer under subsection (b), (c), (m), or 
(o) of section 414 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall 
be treated as 1 employer. 
 
(ii) Employers not in existence in preceding year.--In the case 
of an employer which was not in existence throughout the 
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preceding calendar year, the determination of whether such 
employer is an applicable large employer shall be based on the 
average number of employees that it is reasonably expected 
such employer will employ on business days in the current 
calendar year. 
 
(iii) Predecessors.--Any reference in this subsection to an 
employer shall include a reference to any predecessor of such 
employer. 
 
(D) Application of employer size to assessable penalties.-- 
 
(i) In general.--The number of individuals employed by an 
applicable large employer as full-time employees during any 
month shall be reduced by 30 solely for purposes of 
calculating-- 
 
(I) the assessable payment under subsection (a), or 
 
(II) the overall limitation under subsection (b)(2). 
 
(ii) Aggregation.--In the case of persons treated as 1 employer 
under subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduction under subclause (I) 
or (II) shall be allowed with respect to such persons and such 
reduction shall be allocated among such persons ratably on the 
basis of the number of full-time employees employed by each 
such person. 
 
(E) Full-time equivalents treated as full-time employees.--Solely for 
purposes of determining whether an employer is an applicable large 
employer under this paragraph, an employer shall, in addition to the 
number of full-time employees for any month otherwise determined, 
include for such month a number of full-time employees determined 
by dividing the aggregate number of hours of service of employees 
who are not full-time employees for the month by 120. 
 
(3) Applicable premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction.--The term 
“applicable premium tax credit and cost-sharing reduction” means-- 
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(A) any premium tax credit allowed under section 36B, 
 
(B) any cost-sharing reduction under section 1402 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, and 
  
(C) any advance payment of such credit or reduction under section 
1412 of such Act. 
 
(4) Full-time employee.-- 
 
(A) In general.--The term “full-time employee” means, with respect to 
any month, an employee who is employed on average at least 30 
hours of service per week. 
 
(B) Hours of service.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Labor, shall prescribe such regulations, rules, and 
guidance as may be necessary to determine the hours of service of an 
employee, including rules for the application of this paragraph to 
employees who are not compensated on an hourly basis. 
 
(5) Inflation adjustment.-- 
 
(A) In general.--In the case of any calendar year after 2014, each of 
the dollar amounts in subsection (b) and paragraph (1) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to the product of-- 
 
(i) such dollar amount, and 
 
(ii) the premium adjustment percentage (as defined in section 
1302(c)(4) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) 
for the calendar year. 
 
(B) Rounding.--If the amount of any increase under subparagraph (A) 
is not a multiple of $10, such increase shall be rounded to the next 
lowest multiple of $10. 
 
(6) Other definitions.--Any term used in this section which is also used in 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act shall have the same meaning 
as when used in such Act. 




(7) Tax nondeductible.--For denial of deduction for the tax imposed by this 
section, see section 275(a)(6). 
 
(d) Administration and procedure.-- 
 
(1) In general.--Any assessable payment provided by this section shall be 
paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and shall be assessed and 
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter B of 
chapter 68. 
 
(2) Time for payment.--The Secretary may provide for the payment of any 
assessable payment provided by this section on an annual, monthly, or other 
periodic basis as the Secretary may prescribe. 
 
(3) Coordination with credits, etc.--The Secretary shall prescribe rules, 
regulations, or guidance for the repayment of any assessable payment 
(including interest) if such payment is based on the allowance or payment of 
an applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction with respect to an 
employee, such allowance or payment is subsequently disallowed, and the 
assessable payment would not have been required to be made but for such 
allowance or payment. 
 
[(e) Redesignated (d)] 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 10    Date Filed: 01/18/2011    Page: 77
10 
 
United States Code Annotated  
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code 
  Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 
  Chapter 43. Qualified Pension, Etc., Plans  
 
  § 4980I. Excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health coverage 
 
(a) Imposition of tax.--If-- 
 
(1) an employee is covered under any applicable employer-sponsored 
coverage of an employer at any time during a taxable period, and 
 
(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to the coverage, 
 
there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 40 percent of the excess benefit. 
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United States Code Annotated  
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code  
 Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes  
  Chapter 48. Maintenance of Minimum Essential Coverage 
 
  § 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage 
 
(a) Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage.--An applicable 
individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month. 
 
(b) Shared responsibility payment.-- 
 
(1) In general.--If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an 
applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable under paragraph 
(3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more 
months, then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is hereby 
imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in the 
amount determined under subsection (c). 
 
(2) Inclusion with return.--Any penalty imposed by this section with 
respect to any month shall be included with a taxpayer's return under 
chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes such month. 
 
(3) Payment of penalty.--If an individual with respect to whom a 
penalty is imposed by this section for any month-- 
 
(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of another 
taxpayer for the other taxpayer's taxable year including such 
month, such other taxpayer shall be liable for such penalty, or 
 
(B) files a joint return for the taxable year including such 
month, such individual and the spouse of such individual shall 
be jointly liable for such penalty. 
 
(c) Amount of penalty.-- 
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(1) In general.--The amount of the penalty imposed by this section on 
any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect to failures described in 
subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the lesser of-- 
 
(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts determined under 
paragraph (2) for months in the taxable year during which 1 or 
more such failures occurred, or 
 
(B) an amount equal to the national average premium for 
qualified health plans which have a bronze level of coverage, 
provide coverage for the applicable family size involved, and 
are offered through Exchanges for plan years beginning in the 
calendar year with or within which the taxable year ends. 
 
(2) Monthly penalty amounts.--For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), the 
monthly penalty amount with respect to any taxpayer for any month 
during which any failure described in subsection (b)(1) occurred is an 
amount equal to    1/12 of the greater of the following amounts: 
 
(A) Flat dollar amount.--An amount equal to the lesser of-- 
 
(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts for all 
individuals with respect to whom such failure occurred 
during such month, or 
 
(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar amount 
(determined without regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the 
calendar year with or within which the taxable year ends. 
 
(B) Percentage of income.--An amount equal to the following 
percentage of the excess of the taxpayer's household income for 
the taxable year over the amount of gross income specified in 




(i) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014. 
 
(ii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning in 2015. 




(iii) 2.5 percent for taxable years beginning after 2015. 
 
(3) Applicable dollar amount.--For purposes of paragraph (1)-- 
 
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and 
(C), the applicable dollar amount is $695. 
 
(B) Phase in.--The applicable dollar amount is $95 for 2014 and 
$325 for 2015. 
 
(C) Special rule for individuals under age 18.--If an applicable 
individual has not attained the age of 18 as of the beginning of a 
month, the applicable dollar amount with respect to such 
individual for the month shall be equal to one-half of the 
applicable dollar amount for the calendar year in which the 
month occurs. 
 
(D) Indexing of amount.--In the case of any calendar year 
beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount shall be 
equal to $695, increased by an amount equal to-- 
 
(i) $695, multiplied by 
 
(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under 
section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year, determined by 
substituting “calendar year 2015” for “calendar year 
1992” in subparagraph (B) thereof. 
 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple 
of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the next lowest 
multiple of $50. 
 
(4) Terms relating to income and families.--For purposes of this 
section-- 
 
(A) Family size.--The family size involved with respect to any 
taxpayer shall be equal to the number of individuals for whom 
the taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151 (relating 
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to allowance of deduction for personal exemptions) for the 
taxable year. 
 
(B) Household income.--The term “household income” means, 
with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an amount 
equal to the sum of-- 
 
(i) the modified adjusted gross income of the taxpayer, 
plus 
 
(ii) the aggregate modified adjusted gross incomes of all 
other individuals who-- 
 
(I) were taken into account in determining the 
taxpayer's family size under paragraph (1), and 
 
(II) were required to file a return of tax imposed by 
section 1 for the taxable year. 
 
(C) Modified adjusted gross income.--The term “modified 
adjusted gross income” means adjusted gross income increased 
by-- 
 
(i) any amount excluded from gross income under section 
911, and 
 
(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued by the 
taxpayer during the taxable year which is exempt from 
tax. 
 
[(D) Repealed. Pub.L. 111-152, Title I, § 1002(b)(1), Mar. 30, 
2010, 124 Stat. 1032] 
 
(d) Applicable individual.--For purposes of this section-- 
 
(1) In general.--The term “applicable individual” means, with respect 
to any month, an individual other than an individual described in 
paragraph (2), (3), or (4). 
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(2) Religious exemptions.-- 
 
(A) Religious conscience exemption.--Such term shall not 
include any individual for any month if such individual has in 
effect an exemption under section 1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act which certifies that such 
individual is-- 
 
(i) a member of a recognized religious sect or division 
thereof which is described in section 1402(g)(1), and 
 
(ii) an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such 
sect or division as described in such section. 
 
(B) Health care sharing ministry.-- 
 
(i) In general.--Such term shall not include any individual 
for any month if such individual is a member of a health 
care sharing ministry for the month. 
 
(ii) Health care sharing ministry.--The term “health care 
sharing ministry” means an organization-- 
 
(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(a), 
 
(II) members of which share a common set of 
ethical or religious beliefs and share medical 
expenses among members in accordance with 
those beliefs and without regard to the State in 
which a member resides or is employed, 
 
(III) members of which retain membership even 
after they develop a medical condition, 
 
(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has been in 
existence at all times since December 31, 1999, 
and medical expenses of its members have been 
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shared continuously and without interruption since 
at least December 31, 1999, and 
 
(V) which conducts an annual audit which is 
performed by an independent certified public 
accounting firm in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and which is made 
available to the public upon request. 
 
(3) Individuals not lawfully present.--Such term shall not include an 
individual for any month if for the month the individual is not a 
citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in 
the United States. 
 
(4) Incarcerated individuals.--Such term shall not include an 
individual for any month if for the month the individual is 
incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the disposition of 
charges. 
 
(e) Exemptions.--No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) with 
respect to-- 
 
(1) Individuals who cannot afford coverage.-- 
 
(A) In general.--Any applicable individual for any month if the 
applicable individual's required contribution (determined on an 
annual basis) for coverage for the month exceeds 8 percent of 
such individual's household income for the taxable year 
described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. For purposes of applying this 
subparagraph, the taxpayer's household income shall be 
increased by any exclusion from gross income for any portion 
of the required contribution made through a salary reduction 
arrangement. 
 
(B) Required contribution.--For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term “required contribution” means-- 
 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 10    Date Filed: 01/18/2011    Page: 84
17 
 
(i) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase 
minimum essential coverage consisting of coverage 
through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the portion 
of the annual premium which would be paid by the 
individual (without regard to whether paid through salary 
reduction or otherwise) for self-only coverage, or 
 
(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only to purchase 
minimum essential coverage described in subsection 
(f)(1)(C), the annual premium for the lowest cost bronze 
plan available in the individual market through the 
Exchange in the State in the rating area in which the 
individual resides (without regard to whether the 
individual purchased a qualified health plan through the 
Exchange), reduced by the amount of the credit allowable 
under section 36B for the taxable year (determined as if 
the individual was covered by a qualified health plan 
offered through the Exchange for the entire taxable year). 
 
(C) Special rules for individuals related to employees.--For 
purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an applicable individual is 
eligible for minimum essential coverage through an employer 
by reason of a relationship to an employee, the determination 
under subparagraph (A) shall be made by reference to required 
contribution of the employee. 
 
(D) Indexing.--In the case of plan years beginning in any 
calendar year after 2014, subparagraph (A) shall be applied by 
substituting for „8 percent‟ the percentage the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services determines reflects the excess of 
the rate of premium growth between the preceding calendar 
year and 2013 over the rate of income growth for such period. 
 
(2) Taxpayers with income below filing threshold.--Any applicable 
individual for any month during a calendar year if the individual's 
household income for the taxable year described in section 
1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is 
less than the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) 
with respect to the taxpayer. 




(3) Members of Indian tribes.--Any applicable individual for any 
month during which the individual is a member of an Indian tribe (as 
defined in section 45A(c)(6)). 
 
(4) Months during short coverage gaps.-- 
 
(A) In general.--Any month the last day of which occurred 
during a period in which the applicable individual was not 
covered by minimum essential coverage for a continuous period 
of less than 3 months. 
 
(B) Special rules.--For purposes of applying this paragraph-- 
 
(i) the length of a continuous period shall be determined 
without regard to the calendar years in which months in 
such period occur, 
 
(ii) if a continuous period is greater than the period 
allowed under subparagraph (A), no exception shall be 
provided under this paragraph for any month in the 
period, and 
 
(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous period described in 
subparagraph (A) covering months in a calendar year, the 
exception provided by this paragraph shall only apply to 
months in the first of such periods. 
 
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection of the penalty imposed by this 
section in cases where continuous periods include months in more than 1 taxable 
year. 
 
(5) Hardships.--Any applicable individual who for any month is 
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under 
section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship with respect to the 
capability to obtain coverage under a qualified health plan. 
 
(f) Minimum essential coverage.--For purposes of this section-- 
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(1) In general.--The term “minimum essential coverage” means any of 
the following: 
 
(A) Government sponsored programs.--Coverage under-- 
 
(i) the Medicare program under part A of title XVIII of 
the Social Security Act, 
 
(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, 
 
(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of the Social 
Security Act, 
 
(iv) medical coverage under chapter 55 of title 10, United 
States Code, including coverage under the TRICARE 
program; 
 
(v) a health care program under chapter 17 or 18 of title 
38, United States Code, as determined by the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services and the Secretary, 
 
(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of title 22, United 
States Code (relating to Peace Corps volunteers); or 
 
(vii) the Nonappropriated Fund Health Benefits Program 
of the Department of Defense, established under section 
349 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 10 U.S.C. 1587 note). 
 
(B) Employer-sponsored plan.--Coverage under an eligible 
employer-sponsored plan. 
 
(C) Plans in the individual market.--Coverage under a health 
plan offered in the individual market within a State. 
 
(D) Grandfathered health plan.--Coverage under a 
grandfathered health plan. 




(E) Other coverage.--Such other health benefits coverage, such 
as a State health benefits risk pool, as the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary, 
recognizes for purposes of this subsection. 
 
(2) Eligible employer-sponsored plan.--The term “eligible employer-
sponsored plan” means, with respect to any employee, a group health 
plan or group health insurance coverage offered by an employer to the 
employee which is-- 
 
(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of section 
2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act), or 
 
(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the small or large 
group market within a State. 
 
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan described in 
paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group market. 
 
(3) Excepted benefits not treated as minimum essential coverage.--
The term “minimum essential coverage” shall not include health 
insurance coverage which consists of coverage of excepted benefits-- 
 
(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of section 2791 
of the Public Health Service Act; or 
 
(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such subsection if 
the benefits are provided under a separate policy, certificate, or 
contract of insurance. 
 
(4) Individuals residing outside United States or residents of 
territories.--Any applicable individual shall be treated as having 
minimum essential coverage for any month-- 
 
(A) if such month occurs during any period described in 
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 911(d)(1) which is 
applicable to the individual, or 
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(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident of any possession 
of the United States (as determined under section 937(a)) for 
such month. 
 
(5) Insurance-related terms.--Any term used in this section which is 
also used in title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
shall have the same meaning as when used in such title. 
 
(g) Administration and procedure.-- 
 
(1) In general.--The penalty provided by this section shall be paid 
upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and except as provided in 
paragraph (2), shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as 
an assessable penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68. 
 
(2) Special rules.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law-- 
 
(A) Waiver of criminal penalties.--In the case of any failure by 
a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed by this section, 
such taxpayer shall not be subject to any criminal prosecution 
or penalty with respect to such failure. 
 
(B) Limitations on liens and levies.--The Secretary shall not-- 
 
(i) file notice of lien with respect to any property of a 
taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty 
imposed by this section, or 
 




United States Code Annotated  
Title 26. Internal Revenue Code  
  Subtitle D. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes  
  Chapter 49. Cosmetic Services 
 
  § 5000B. Imposition of tax on indoor tanning services 
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(a) In general.--There is hereby imposed on any indoor tanning service a tax 
equal to 10 percent of the amount paid for such service (determined without 
regard to this section), whether paid by insurance or otherwise. 
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United States Code Annotated  
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
 Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans 
  Subchapter III. Available Coverage Choices for All Americans 
  Part A. Establishment of Qualified Health Plans 
 
  § 18022. Essential health benefits requirements 
 
(a) Essential health benefits package 
 
In this chapter, the term “essential health benefits package” means, with 
respect to any health plan, coverage that-- 
 
(1) provides for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary under 
subsection (b); 
 
(2) limits cost-sharing for such coverage in accordance with subsection (c); 
and 
 
(3) subject to subsection (e), provides either the bronze, silver, gold, or 
platinum level of coverage described in subsection (d). 
 
(b) Essential health benefits 
 
(1) In general 
 
Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary shall define the essential health 
benefits, except that such benefits shall include at least the following general 
categories and the items and services covered within the categories: 
 
(A) Ambulatory patient services. 
 




(D) Maternity and newborn care. 
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(E) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral 
health treatment. 
 
(F) Prescription drugs. 
 
(G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. 
 
(H) Laboratory services. 
 
(I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management. 
 




(A) In general 
 
The Secretary shall ensure that the scope of the essential health benefits 
under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical 
employer plan, as determined by the Secretary. To inform this 
determination, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of employer-
sponsored coverage to determine the benefits typically covered by 
employers, including multiemployer plans, and provide a report on such 




In defining the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1), and in 
revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H), the Secretary shall submit a 
report to the appropriate committees of Congress containing a certification 
from the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
that such essential health benefits meet the limitation described in paragraph 
(2). 
 
(3) Notice and hearing 
 
In defining the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1), and in 
revising the benefits under paragraph (4)(H), the Secretary shall provide 
notice and an opportunity for public comment. 




(4) Required elements for consideration 
 
In defining the essential health benefits under paragraph (1), the Secretary 
shall-- 
 
(A) ensure that such essential health benefits reflect an appropriate balance 
among the categories described in such subsection, so that benefits are not 
unduly weighted toward any category; 
 
(B) not make coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish 
incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against 
individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life; 
 
(C) take into account the health care needs of diverse segments of the 
population, including women, children, persons with disabilities, and other 
groups; 
 
(D) ensure that health benefits established as essential not be subject to 
denial to individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals' age 
or expected length of life or of the individuals' present or predicted 
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life; 
 
(E) provide that a qualified health plan shall not be treated as providing 
coverage for the essential health benefits described in paragraph (1) unless 
the plan provides that-- 
 
(i) coverage for emergency department services will be provided without 
imposing any requirement under the plan for prior authorization of services 
or any limitation on coverage where the provider of services does not have a 
contractual relationship with the plan for the providing of services that is 
more restrictive than the requirements or limitations that apply to emergency 
department services received from providers who do have such a contractual 
relationship with the plan; and 
 
(ii) if such services are provided out-of-network, the cost-sharing 
requirement (expressed as a copayment amount or coinsurance rate) is the 
same requirement that would apply if such services were provided in-
network; 




(F) provide that if a plan described in section 18031(b)(2)(B)(ii) of this title 
(relating to stand-alone dental benefits plans) is offered through an 
Exchange, another health plan offered through such Exchange shall not fail 
to be treated as a qualified health plan solely because the plan does not offer 
coverage of benefits offered through the stand-alone plan that are otherwise 
required under paragraph (1)(J); and 
 
(G) periodically review the essential health benefits under paragraph (1), and 
provide a report to Congress and the public that contains-- 
 
(i) an assessment of whether enrollees are facing any difficulty accessing 
needed services for reasons of coverage or cost; 
 
(ii) an assessment of whether the essential health benefits needs to be 
modified or updated to account for changes in medical evidence or scientific 
advancement; 
 
(iii) information on how the essential health benefits will be modified to 
address any such gaps in access or changes in the evidence base; 
 
(iv) an assessment of the potential of additional or expanded benefits to 
increase costs and the interactions between the addition or expansion of 
benefits and reductions in existing benefits to meet actuarial limitations 
described in paragraph (2); and 
 
(H) periodically update the essential health benefits under paragraph (1) to 
address any gaps in access to coverage or changes in the evidence base the 
Secretary identifies in the review conducted under subparagraph (G). 
 
(5) Rule of construction 
 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit a health plan from 
providing benefits in excess of the essential health benefits described in this 
subsection. 
 
(c) Requirements relating to cost-sharing 
 
(1) Annual limitation on cost-sharing 






The cost-sharing incurred under a health plan with respect to self-only 
coverage or coverage other than self-only coverage for a plan year beginning 
in 2014 shall not exceed the dollar amounts in effect under section 
223(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for self-only and 
family coverage, respectively, for taxable years beginning in 2014. 
 
(B) 2015 and later 
 
In the case of any plan year beginning in a calendar year after 2014, the 
limitation under this paragraph shall-- 
 
(i) in the case of self-only coverage, be equal to the dollar amount under 
subparagraph (A) for self-only coverage for plan years beginning in 2014, 
increased by an amount equal to the product of that amount and the premium 
adjustment percentage under paragraph (4) for the calendar year; and 
 
(ii) in the case of other coverage, twice the amount in effect under clause (i). 
 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such 
increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50. 
 
(2) Annual limitation on deductibles for employer-sponsored plans 
 
(A) In general 
 
In the case of a health plan offered in the small group market, the deductible 
under the plan shall not exceed-- 
 
(i) $2,000 in the case of a plan covering a single individual; and 
 
(ii) $4,000 in the case of any other plan. 
 
The amounts under clauses (i) and (ii) may be increased by the maximum 
amount of reimbursement which is reasonably available to a participant 
under a flexible spending arrangement described in section 106(c)(2) of the 
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Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (determined without regard to any salary 
reduction arrangement). 
 
(B) Indexing of limits 
 
In the case of any plan year beginning in a calendar year after 2014-- 
 
(i) the dollar amount under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be increased by an 
amount equal to the product of that amount and the premium adjustment 
percentage under paragraph (4) for the calendar year; and 
 
(ii) the dollar amount under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be increased to an 
amount equal to twice the amount in effect under subparagraph (A)(i) for 
plan years beginning in the calendar year, determined after application of 
clause (i). 
 
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a multiple of $50, such 
increase shall be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50. 
 
(C) Actuarial value 
 
The limitation under this paragraph shall be applied in such a manner so as 
to not affect the actuarial value of any health plan, including a plan in the 
bronze level. 
 
(D) Coordination with preventive limits 
 
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to allow a plan to have a 





In this chapter-- 
 
(A) In general 
 
The term “cost-sharing” includes-- 
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(i) deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or similar charges; and 
 
(ii) any other expenditure required of an insured individual which is a 
qualified medical expense (within the meaning of section 223(d)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986) with respect to essential health benefits 




Such term does not include premiums, balance billing amounts for non-
network providers, or spending for non-covered services. 
 
(4) Premium adjustment percentage 
 
For purposes of paragraphs (1)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(i), the premium adjustment 
percentage for any calendar year is the percentage (if any) by which the 
average per capita premium for health insurance coverage in the United 
States for the preceding calendar year (as estimated by the Secretary no later 
than October 1 of such preceding calendar year) exceeds such average per 
capita premium for 2013 (as determined by the Secretary). 
 
(d) Levels of coverage 
 
(1) Levels of coverage defined 
 
The levels of coverage described in this subsection are as follows: 
 
(A) Bronze level 
 
A plan in the bronze level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed 
to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full 
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
 
(B) Silver level 
 
A plan in the silver level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed to 
provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 70 percent of the full 
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
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(C) Gold level 
 
A plan in the gold level shall provide a level of coverage that is designed to 
provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 80 percent of the full 
actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
 
(D) Platinum level 
 
A plan in the platinum level shall provide a level of coverage that is 
designed to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 90 percent of 
the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan. 
 
(2) Actuarial value 
 
(A) In general 
 
Under regulations issued by the Secretary, the level of coverage of a plan 
shall be determined on the basis that the essential health benefits described 
in subsection (b) shall be provided to a standard population (and without 
regard to the population the plan may actually provide benefits to). 
 
(B) Employer contributions 
 
The Secretary shall issue regulations under which employer contributions to 
a health savings account (within the meaning of section 223 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986) may be taken into account in determining the level 




In determining under this chapter, the Public Health Service Act, or the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 the percentage of the total allowed costs of 
benefits provided under a group health plan or health insurance coverage 
that are provided by such plan or coverage, the rules contained in the 
regulations under this paragraph shall apply. 
 
(3) Allowable variance 
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The Secretary shall develop guidelines to provide for a de minimis variation 
in the actuarial valuations used in determining the level of coverage of a plan 
to account for differences in actuarial estimates. 
 
(4) Plan reference 
 
In this chapter, any reference to a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum plan shall 
be treated as a reference to a qualified health plan providing a bronze, silver, 
gold, or platinum level of coverage, as the case may be. 
 
(e) Catastrophic plan 
 
(1) In general 
 
A health plan not providing a bronze, silver, gold, or platinum level of 
coverage shall be treated as meeting the requirements of subsection (d) with 
respect to any plan year if-- 
 
(A) the only individuals who are eligible to enroll in the plan are individuals 
described in paragraph (2); and 
 
(B) the plan provides-- 
 
(i) except as provided in clause (ii), the essential health benefits determined 
under subsection (b), except that the plan provides no benefits for any plan 
year until the individual has incurred cost-sharing expenses in an amount 
equal to the annual limitation in effect under subsection (c)(1) for the plan 
year (except as provided for in section 300gg-13 of this title); and 
 
(ii) coverage for at least three primary care visits. 
 
(2) Individuals eligible for enrollment 
 
An individual is described in this paragraph for any plan year if the 
individual-- 
 
(A) has not attained the age of 30 before the beginning of the plan year; or 
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(B) has a certification in effect for any plan year under this chapter that the 
individual is exempt from the requirement under section 5000A of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by reason of-- 
 
(i) section 5000A(e)(1) of such Code (relating to individuals without 
affordable coverage); or 
 
(ii) section 5000A(e)(5) of such Code (relating to individuals with 
hardships). 
 
(3) Restriction to individual market 
 
If a health insurance issuer offers a health plan described in this subsection, 
the issuer may only offer the plan in the individual market. 
 
(f) Child-only plans 
 
If a qualified health plan is offered through the Exchange in any level of 
coverage specified under subsection (d), the issuer shall also offer that plan 
through the Exchange in that level as a plan in which the only enrollees are 
individuals who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained the age 
of 21, and such plan shall be treated as a qualified health plan. 
 
(g) Payments to Federally-qualified health centers 
 
If any item or service covered by a qualified health plan is provided by a 
Federally-qualified health center (as defined in section 1396d(l)(2)(B) of this 
title) to an enrollee of the plan, the offeror of the plan shall pay to the center 
for the item or service an amount that is not less than the amount of payment 
that would have been paid to the center under section 1396a(bb) of this title 
for such item or service. 
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United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
 Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans 
 Subchapter III. Available Coverage Choices for All Americans 
 Part B. Consumer Choices and Insurance Competition through Health 
Benefit Exchanges 
 § 18031. Affordable choices of health benefit plans 
 
(a) Assistance to States to establish American Health Benefit Exchanges 
 
(1) Planning and establishment grants 
 
There shall be appropriated to the Secretary, out of any moneys in the Treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, an amount necessary to enable the Secretary to make 
awards, not later than 1 year after March 23, 2010, to States in the amount 
specified in paragraph (2) for the uses described in paragraph (3). 
 
(2) Amount specified 
 
For each fiscal year, the Secretary shall determine the total amount that the 
Secretary will make available to each State for grants under this subsection. 
 
(3) Use of funds 
 
A State shall use amounts awarded under this subsection for activities (including 
planning activities) related to establishing an American Health Benefit Exchange, 
as described in subsection (b). 
 
(4) Renewability of grant 
 
(A) In general 
 
Subject to subsection (d)(4), the Secretary may renew a grant awarded under 
paragraph (1) if the State recipient of such grant-- 
 
(i) is making progress, as determined by the Secretary, toward-- 
 
(I) establishing an Exchange; and 
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(II) implementing the reforms described in subtitles A and C (and the 
amendments made by such subtitles); and 
 




No grant shall be awarded under this subsection after January 1, 2015. 
 
(5) Technical assistance to facilitate participation in SHOP Exchanges 
 
The Secretary shall provide technical assistance to States to facilitate the 
participation of qualified small businesses in such States in SHOP Exchanges. 
 
(b) American Health Benefit Exchanges 
 
(1) In general 
 
Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American Health 
Benefit Exchange (referred to in this chapter as an “Exchange”) for the State that-
- 
 
(A) facilitates the purchase of qualified health plans; 
 
(B) provides for the establishment of a Small Business Health Options Program 
(in this chapter referred to as a “SHOP Exchange”) that is designed to assist 
qualified employers in the State who are small employers in facilitating the 
enrollment of their employees in qualified health plans offered in the small 
group market in the State; and 
 
(C) meets the requirements of subsection (d). 
 
(2) Merger of individual and SHOP Exchanges 
 
A State may elect to provide only one Exchange in the State for providing both 
Exchange and SHOP Exchange services to both qualified individuals and 
qualified small employers, but only if the Exchange has adequate resources to 
assist such individuals and employers. 
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(c) Responsibilities of the Secretary 
 
(1) In general 
 
The Secretary shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the certification of health 
plans as qualified health plans. Such criteria shall require that, to be certified, a 
plan shall, at a minimum-- 
 
(A) meet marketing requirements, and not employ marketing practices or 
benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in such plan 
by individuals with significant health needs; 
 
(B) ensure a sufficient choice of providers (in a manner consistent with 
applicable network adequacy provisions under section 300gg-1(c) of this title of 
the Public Health Service Act), and provide information to enrollees and 
prospective enrollees on the availability of in-network and out-of-network 
providers; 
 
(C) include within health insurance plan networks those essential community 
providers, where available, that serve predominately low-income, medically-
underserved individuals, such as health care providers defined in section 
256b(a)(4) of this title and providers described in section 1396r-
8(c)(1)(D)(i)(IV) of this title, except that nothing in this subparagraph shall be 
construed to require any health plan to provide coverage for any specific 
medical procedure; 
 
(D)(i) be accredited with respect to local performance on clinical quality 
measures such as the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set, 
patient experience ratings on a standardized Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems survey, as well as consumer access, 
utilization management, quality assurance, provider credentialing, complaints 
and appeals, network adequacy and access, and patient information programs 
by any entity recognized by the Secretary for the accreditation of health 
insurance issuers or plans (so long as any such entity has transparent and 
rigorous methodological and scoring criteria); or 
 
(ii) receive such accreditation within a period established by an Exchange for 
such accreditation that is applicable to all qualified health plans; 
 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 10    Date Filed: 01/18/2011    Page: 103
36 
 
(E) implement a quality improvement strategy described in subsection (g)(1); 
 
(F) utilize a uniform enrollment form that qualified individuals and qualified 
employers may use (either electronically or on paper) in enrolling in qualified 
health plans offered through such Exchange, and that takes into account criteria 
that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners develops and 
submits to the Secretary; 
 
(G) utilize the standard format established for presenting health benefits plan 
options; 
 
(H) provide information to enrollees and prospective enrollees, and to each 
Exchange in which the plan is offered, on any quality measures for health plan 
performance endorsed under section 280j-2 of this title, as applicable; and 
 
(I) report to the Secretary at least annually and in such manner as the Secretary 
shall require, pediatric quality reporting measures consistent with the pediatric 
quality reporting measures established under section 1320b-9a of this title. 
 
(2) Rule of construction 
 
Nothing in paragraph (1)(C) shall be construed to require a qualified health plan 
to contract with a provider described in such paragraph if such provider refuses to 
accept the generally applicable payment rates of such plan. 
 
(3) Rating system 
 
The Secretary shall develop a rating system that would rate qualified health plans 
offered through an Exchange in each benefits level on the basis of the relative 
quality and price. The Exchange shall include the quality rating in the 
information provided to individuals and employers through the Internet portal 
established under paragraph (4). 
 
(4) Enrollee satisfaction system 
 
The Secretary shall develop an enrollee satisfaction survey system that would 
evaluate the level of enrollee satisfaction with qualified health plans offered 
through an Exchange, for each such qualified health plan that had more than 500 
enrollees in the previous year. The Exchange shall include enrollee satisfaction 
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information in the information provided to individuals and employers through the 
Internet portal established under paragraph (5) in a manner that allows 
individuals to easily compare enrollee satisfaction levels between comparable 
plans. 
 
(5) Internet portals 
 
The Secretary shall-- 
 
(A) continue to operate, maintain, and update the Internet portal developed 
under section 18003(a) of this title and to assist States in developing and 
maintaining their own such portal; and 
 
(B) make available for use by Exchanges a model template for an Internet portal 
that may be used to direct qualified individuals and qualified employers to 
qualified health plans, to assist such individuals and employers in determining 
whether they are eligible to participate in an Exchange or eligible for a premium 
tax credit or cost-sharing reduction, and to present standardized information 
(including quality ratings) regarding qualified health plans offered through an 
Exchange to assist consumers in making easy health insurance choices. 
 
Such template shall include, with respect to each qualified health plan offered 
through the Exchange in each rating area, access to the uniform outline of 
coverage the plan is required to provide under section 300gg-16 of this title and 
to a copy of the plan's written policy. 
 
(6) Enrollment periods 
 
The Secretary shall require an Exchange to provide for-- 
 
(A) an initial open enrollment, as determined by the Secretary (such 
determination to be made not later than July 1, 2012); 
 
(B) annual open enrollment periods, as determined by the Secretary for calendar 
years after the initial enrollment period; 
 
(C) special enrollment periods specified in section 9801 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 and other special enrollment periods under circumstances similar 
to such periods under part D of title XVIII of the Social Security Act; and 




(D) special monthly enrollment periods for Indians (as defined in section 1603 




(1) In general 
 
An Exchange shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is 
established by a State. 
 
(2) Offering of coverage 
 
(A) In general 
 
An Exchange shall make available qualified health plans to qualified 




(i) In general 
 
An Exchange may not make available any health plan that is not a qualified 
health plan. 
 
(ii) Offering of stand-alone dental benefits 
 
Each Exchange within a State shall allow an issuer of a plan that only 
provides limited scope dental benefits meeting the requirements of section 
9832(c)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to offer the plan through 
the Exchange (either separately or in conjunction with a qualified health plan) 
if the plan provides pediatric dental benefits meeting the requirements of 
section 18022(b)(1)(J) of this title). 
 
(3) Rules relating to additional required benefits 
 
(A) In general 
 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an Exchange may make available a 
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qualified health plan notwithstanding any provision of law that may require 
benefits other than the essential health benefits specified under section 18022(b) 
of this title. 
 
(B) States may require additional benefits 
 
(i) In general 
 
Subject to the requirements of clause (ii), a State may require that a qualified 
health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the essential 
health benefits specified under section 18022(b) of this title. 
 
(ii) State must assume cost 
 
A State shall make payments-- 
 
(I) to an individual enrolled in a qualified health plan offered in such State; 
or 
 
(II) on behalf of an individual described in subclause (I) directly to the 
qualified health plan in which such individual is enrolled; 
 




An Exchange shall, at a minimum-- 
 
(A) implement procedures for the certification, recertification, and 
decertification, consistent with guidelines developed by the Secretary under 
subsection (c), of health plans as qualified health plans; 
 
(B) provide for the operation of a toll-free telephone hotline to respond to 
requests for assistance; 
 
(C) maintain an Internet website through which enrollees and prospective 
enrollees of qualified health plans may obtain standardized comparative 
information on such plans; 
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(D) assign a rating to each qualified health plan offered through such Exchange 
in accordance with the criteria developed by the Secretary under subsection 
(c)(3); 
 
(E) utilize a standardized format for presenting health benefits plan options in 
the Exchange, including the use of the uniform outline of coverage established 
under section 300gg-15 of this title; 
 
(F) in accordance with section 18083 of this title, inform individuals of 
eligibility requirements for the medicaid program under title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, the CHIP program under title XXI of such Act, or any applicable 
State or local public program and if through screening of the application by the 
Exchange, the Exchange determines that such individuals are eligible for any 
such program, enroll such individuals in such program; 
 
(G) establish and make available by electronic means a calculator to determine 
the actual cost of coverage after the application of any premium tax credit under 
section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and any cost-sharing 
reduction under section 18071 of this title; 
 
(H) subject to section 18081 of this title, grant a certification attesting that, for 
purposes of the individual responsibility penalty under section 5000A of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an individual is exempt from the individual 
requirement or from the penalty imposed by such section because-- 
 
(i) there is no affordable qualified health plan available through the Exchange, 
or the individual's employer, covering the individual; or 
 
(ii) the individual meets the requirements for any other such exemption from 
the individual responsibility requirement or penalty; 
 
(I) transfer to the Secretary of the Treasury-- 
 
(i) a list of the individuals who are issued a certification under subparagraph 
(H), including the name and taxpayer identification number of each 
individual; 
 
(ii) the name and taxpayer identification number of each individual who was 
an employee of an employer but who was determined to be eligible for the 
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premium tax credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
because-- 
 
(I) the employer did not provide minimum essential coverage; or 
 
(II) the employer provided such minimum essential coverage but it was 
determined under section 36B(c)(2)(C) of such Code to either be 
unaffordable to the employee or not provide the required minimum actuarial 
value; and 
 
(iii) the name and taxpayer identification number of each individual who 
notifies the Exchange under section 18081(b)(4) of this title that they have 
changed employers and of each individual who ceases coverage under a 
qualified health plan during a plan year (and the effective date of such 
cessation); 
 
(J) provide to each employer the name of each employee of the employer 
described in subparagraph (I)(ii) who ceases coverage under a qualified health 
plan during a plan year (and the effective date of such cessation); and 
 
(K) establish the Navigator program described in subsection (i). 
 
(5) Funding limitations 
 
(A) No Federal funds for continued operations 
 
In establishing an Exchange under this section, the State shall ensure that such 
Exchange is self-sustaining beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing 
the Exchange to charge assessments or user fees to participating health 
insurance issuers, or to otherwise generate funding, to support its operations. 
 
(B) Prohibiting wasteful use of funds 
 
In carrying out activities under this subsection, an Exchange shall not utilize 
any funds intended for the administrative and operational expenses of the 
Exchange for staff retreats, promotional giveaways, excessive executive 
compensation, or promotion of Federal or State legislative and regulatory 
modifications. 
 





An Exchange shall consult with stakeholders relevant to carrying out the 
activities under this section, including-- 
 
(A) educated health care consumers who are enrollees in qualified health plans; 
 
(B) individuals and entities with experience in facilitating enrollment in 
qualified health plans; 
 
(C) representatives of small businesses and self-employed individuals; 
 
(D) State Medicaid offices; and 
 
(E) advocates for enrolling hard to reach populations. 
 
(7) Publication of costs 
 
An Exchange shall publish the average costs of licensing, regulatory fees, and 
any other payments required by the Exchange, and the administrative costs of 
such Exchange, on an Internet website to educate consumers on such costs. Such 




(1) In general 
 
An Exchange may certify a health plan as a qualified health plan if-- 
 
(A) such health plan meets the requirements for certification as promulgated by 
the Secretary under subsection (c)(1); and 
 
(B) the Exchange determines that making available such health plan through 
such Exchange is in the interests of qualified individuals and qualified 
employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates, except that 
the Exchange may not exclude a health plan-- 
 
(i) on the basis that such plan is a fee-for-service plan; 
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(ii) through the imposition of premium price controls; or 
 
(iii) on the basis that the plan provides treatments necessary to prevent 
patients' deaths in circumstances the Exchange determines are inappropriate or 
too costly. 
 
(2) Premium considerations 
 
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health 
plans to submit a justification for any premium increase prior to implementation 
of the increase. Such plans shall prominently post such information on their 
websites. The Exchange shall take this information, and the information and the 
recommendations provided to the Exchange by the State under section 300gg-
94(b)(1) of this title (relating to patterns or practices of excessive or unjustified 
premium increases), into consideration when determining whether to make such 
health plan available through the Exchange. The Exchange shall take into account 
any excess of premium growth outside the Exchange as compared to the rate of 
such growth inside the Exchange, including information reported by the States. 
 
(3) Transparency in coverage 
 
(A) In general 
 
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health 
plans to submit to the Exchange, the Secretary, the State insurance 
commissioner, and make available to the public, accurate and timely disclosure 
of the following information: 
 
(i) Claims payment policies and practices. 
 
(ii) Periodic financial disclosures. 
 
(iii) Data on enrollment. 
 
(iv) Data on disenrollment. 
 
(v) Data on the number of claims that are denied. 
 
(vi) Data on rating practices. 




(vii) Information on cost-sharing and payments with respect to any out-of-
network coverage. 
 
(viii) Information on enrollee and participant rights under this title. 
 
(ix) Other information as determined appropriate by the Secretary. 
 
(B) Use of plain language 
 
The information required to be submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be 
provided in plain language. The term “plain language” means language that the 
intended audience, including individuals with limited English proficiency, can 
readily understand and use because that language is concise, well-organized, 
and follows other best practices of plain language writing. The Secretary and 
the Secretary of Labor shall jointly develop and issue guidance on best practices 
of plain language writing. 
 
(C) Cost sharing transparency 
 
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking certification as qualified health 
plans to permit individuals to learn the amount of cost-sharing (including 
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) under the individual's plan or 
coverage that the individual would be responsible for paying with respect to the 
furnishing of a specific item or service by a participating provider in a timely 
manner upon the request of the individual. At a minimum, such information 
shall be made available to such individual through an Internet website and such 
other means for individuals without access to the Internet. 
 
(D) Group health plans 
 
The Secretary of Labor shall update and harmonize the Secretary's rules 
concerning the accurate and timely disclosure to participants by group health 
plans of plan disclosure, plan terms and conditions, and periodic financial 
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(1) Regional or other interstate Exchanges 
 
An Exchange may operate in more than one State if-- 
 
(A) each State in which such Exchange operates permits such operation; and 
 
(B) the Secretary approves such regional or interstate Exchange. 
 
(2) Subsidiary Exchanges 
 
A State may establish one or more subsidiary Exchanges if-- 
 
(A) each such Exchange serves a geographically distinct area; and 
 
(B) the area served by each such Exchange is at least as large as a rating area 
described in section 300gg(a) of this title. 
 
(3) Authority to contract 
 
(A) In general 
 
A State may elect to authorize an Exchange established by the State under this 
section to enter into an agreement with an eligible entity to carry out 1 or more 
responsibilities of the Exchange. 
 
(B) Eligible entity 
 
In this paragraph, the term “eligible entity” means-- 
 
(i) a person-- 
 
(I) incorporated under, and subject to the laws of, 1 or more States; 
 
(II) that has demonstrated experience on a State or regional basis in the 
individual and small group health insurance markets and in benefits 
coverage; and 
 
(III) that is not a health insurance issuer or that is treated under subsection 
(a) or (b) of section 52 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as a member of 
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the same controlled group of corporations (or under common control with) 
as a health insurance issuer; or 
 
(ii) the State medicaid agency under title XIX of the Social Security Act. 
 
(g) Rewarding quality through market-based incentives 
 
(1) Strategy described 
 
A strategy described in this paragraph is a payment structure that provides 
increased reimbursement or other incentives for-- 
 
(A) improving health outcomes through the implementation of activities that 
shall include quality reporting, effective case management, care coordination, 
chronic disease management, medication and care compliance initiatives, 
including through the use of the medical home model, for treatment or services 
under the plan or coverage; 
 
(B) the implementation of activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a 
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered 
education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and post 
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care professional; 
 
(C) the implementation of activities to improve patient safety and reduce 
medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, evidence 
based medicine, and health information technology under the plan or coverage; 
 
(D) the implementation of wellness and health promotion activities; and 
 
(E) the implementation of activities to reduce health and health care disparities, 
including through the use of language services, community outreach, and 




The Secretary, in consultation with experts in health care quality and 
stakeholders, shall develop guidelines concerning the matters described in 
paragraph (1). 
 





The guidelines developed under paragraph (2) shall require the periodic reporting 
to the applicable Exchange of the activities that a qualified health plan has 
conducted to implement a strategy described in paragraph (1). 
 
(h) Quality improvement 
 
(1) Enhancing patient safety 
 
Beginning on January 1, 2015, a qualified health plan may contract with-- 
 
(A) a hospital with greater than 50 beds only if such hospital-- 
 
(i) utilizes a patient safety evaluation system as described in part C of title IX 
of the Public Health Service Act; and 
 
(ii) implements a mechanism to ensure that each patient receives a 
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-centered 
education and counseling, comprehensive discharge planning, and post 
discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health care professional; or 
 
(B) a health care provider only if such provider implements such mechanisms to 




The Secretary may establish reasonable exceptions to the requirements described 









(1) In general 
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An Exchange shall establish a program under which it awards grants to entities 




(A) In general 
 
To be eligible to receive a grant under paragraph (1), an entity shall 
demonstrate to the Exchange involved that the entity has existing relationships, 
or could readily establish relationships, with employers and employees, 
consumers (including uninsured and underinsured consumers), or self-




Entities described in subparagraph (A) may include trade, industry, and 
professional associations, commercial fishing industry organizations, ranching 
and farming organizations, community and consumer-focused nonprofit groups, 
chambers of commerce, unions, resource partners of the Small Business 
Administration, other licensed insurance agents and brokers, and other entities 
that-- 
 
(i) are capable of carrying out the duties described in paragraph (3); 
 
(ii) meet the standards described in paragraph (4); and 
 





An entity that serves as a navigator under a grant under this subsection shall-- 
 
(A) conduct public education activities to raise awareness of the availability of 
qualified health plans; 
 
(B) distribute fair and impartial information concerning enrollment in qualified 
health plans, and the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and cost-sharing reductions under section 
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18071 of this title; 
 
(C) facilitate enrollment in qualified health plans; 
 
(D) provide referrals to any applicable office of health insurance consumer 
assistance or health insurance ombudsman established under section 300gg-93 
of this title, or any other appropriate State agency or agencies, for any enrollee 
with a grievance, complaint, or question regarding their health plan, coverage, 
or a determination under such plan or coverage; and 
 
(E) provide information in a manner that is culturally and linguistically 





(A) In general 
 
The Secretary shall establish standards for navigators under this subsection, 
including provisions to ensure that any private or public entity that is selected as 
a navigator is qualified, and licensed if appropriate, to engage in the navigator 
activities described in this subsection and to avoid conflicts of interest. Under 
such standards, a navigator shall not-- 
 
(i) be a health insurance issuer; or 
 
(ii) receive any consideration directly or indirectly from any health insurance 
issuer in connection with the enrollment of any qualified individuals or 
employees of a qualified employer in a qualified health plan. 
 
(5) Fair and impartial information and services 
 
The Secretary, in collaboration with States, shall develop standards to ensure that 




Grants under this subsection shall be made from the operational funds of the 
Exchange and not Federal funds received by the State to establish the Exchange. 




(j) Applicability of mental health parity 
 
Section 300gg-26 of this title shall apply to qualified health plans in the same 
manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers 




An Exchange may not establish rules that conflict with or prevent the application 




(Pub.L. 111-148, Title I, § 1311, Title X, §§ 10104(e) to (h), 10203(a), Mar. 23, 
2010, 124 Stat. 173, 900, 927.) 
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ERISA  SELECTED SECTIONS 
 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 18. Employee Retirement Income Security Program (Refs & Annos) 
 Subchapter I. Protection of Employee Benefit Rights (Refs & Annos) 
 Subtitle A. General Provisions 
§ 1001. Congressional findings and declaration of policy 
 
 
(a) Benefit plans as affecting interstate commerce and the Federal taxing power 
 
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee 
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational 
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the 
continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents 
are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public 
interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of 
employment and the successful development of industrial relations; that they have 
become an important factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their 
activities, and of the activities of their participants, and the employers, employee 
organizations, and other entities by which they are established or maintained; that a 
large volume of the activities of such plans are carried on by means of the mails 
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; that owing to the lack of employee 
information and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in 
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general 
welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be 
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such 
plans; that they substantially affect the revenues of the United States because they 
are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment; that despite the enormous growth in 
such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated 
retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that 
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability 
of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be 
endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have 
been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of 
anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees 
and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and 
to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided 
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assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness. 
 
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and 
reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries 
 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce 
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, 
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of 
financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of 
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, 
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the 
Federal courts. 
 
(c) Protection of interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and beneficiaries 
by vesting of accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, requiring 
termination insurance 
 
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate 
commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private 
pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the 
soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of 
employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of 
funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance. 
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United States Code Annotated  
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
 Chapter 157. Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans 
 Subchapter V. Shared Responsibility for Health Care 
 Part A. Individual Responsibility 




Congress makes the following findings: 
 
(1) In general 
 
The individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section (in this 
subsection referred to as the “requirement”) is commercial and economic in 
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects 
described in paragraph (2). 
 
(2) Effects on the national economy and interstate commerce 
 
The effects described in this paragraph are the following: 
 
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in 
nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is 
paid for, and when health insurance is purchased. In the absence of the 
requirement, some individuals would make an economic and financial decision 
to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases 
financial risks to households and medical providers. 
 
(B) Health insurance and health care services are a significant part of the 
national economy. National health spending is projected to increase from 
$2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to 
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance spending is projected to 
be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and pays for medical supplies, drugs, and 
equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insurance 
is sold by national or regional health insurance companies, health insurance is 
sold in interstate commerce and claims payments flow through interstate 
commerce. 
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(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will add 
millions of new consumers to the health insurance market, increasing the supply 
of, and demand for, health care services, and will increase the number and share 
of Americans who are insured. 
 
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage by building upon and 
strengthening the private employer-based health insurance system, which 
covers 176,000,000 Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar 
requirement has strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the 
economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based coverage 
has actually increased. 
 
(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer 
health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the 
number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of 
this Act, will significantly reduce this economic cost. 
 
(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was 
$43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this cost, health care providers pass on the 
cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost-shifting 
increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year. By significantly 
reducing the number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other 
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance premiums. 
 
(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical 
expenses. By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will improve 
financial security for families. 
 
(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 
1001 et seq.), the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this 
Act, the Federal Government has a significant role in regulating health 
insurance. The requirement is an essential part of this larger regulation of 
economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would undercut Federal 
regulation of the health insurance market. 
 
(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as added by 
section 1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals would 
wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly 
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increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other 
provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the 
health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower 
health insurance premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective 
health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be 
sold. 
 
(J) Administrative costs for private health insurance, which were 
$90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current 
individual and small group markets. By significantly increasing health 
insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase 
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this 
Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health insurance 
premiums. The requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated 
administrative costs. 
 
(3) Supreme Court ruling 
 
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 
(1944)), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is interstate 




(Pub.L. 111-148, Title I, § 1501(a), Title X, § 10106(a), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 
242, 907.) 
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HIPAA  Title I  Selected Sections 
 
United States Code Annotated  
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare  
Chapter 6A. Public Health Service  
Subchapter XXV. Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage Part A. 
Individual and Group Market Reforms  
Subpart 1. Portability, Access, and Renewability Requirements  
 
§ 300gg-5. Non-discrimination in health care 
 
(a) Providers 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage shall not discriminate with respect to participation under 
the plan or coverage against any health care provider who is acting within the 
scope of that provider's license or certification under applicable State law. This 
section shall not require that a group health plan or health insurance issuer contract 
with any health care provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions for 
participation established by the plan or issuer. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as preventing a group health plan, a health insurance issuer, or the 




The provisions of section 218c of Title 29 (relating to non-discrimination) shall 
apply with respect to a group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group 
or individual health insurance coverage. 
 
United States Code Annotated  
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare 
Chapter 6A. Public Health Service  
Subchapter XXV. Requirements Relating to Health Insurance Coverage  
Part A. Individual and Group Market Reforms 
Subpart 1. Portability, Access, and Renewability Requirements  
 
§ 300gg-6. Comprehensive health insurance coverage 
 
(a) Coverage for essential health benefits package 
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A health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individual or 
small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential health 
benefits package required under section 18022(a) of this title. 
 
(b) Cost-sharing under group health plans 
 
A group health plan shall ensure that any annual cost-sharing imposed under the 
plan does not exceed the limitations provided for under paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
section 18022(c) of this title. 
 
(c) Child-only plans 
 
If a health insurance issuer offers health insurance coverage in any level of 
coverage specified under section 18022(d) of this title, the issuer shall also offer 
such coverage in that level as a plan in which the only enrollees are individuals 
who, as of the beginning of a plan year, have not attained the age of 21. 
 
(d) Dental only 
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SEC. 10001. EMPLOYERS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CERTAIN 
EMPLOYEES AND FAMILY MEMBERS WITH CONTINUED HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE AT GROUP RATES (INTERNAL REVENUE 
CODE AMENDMENTS). 
 
(a) DENIAL OF DEDUCTION FOR EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION TO PLAN. 
-- Subsection (i) of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to 
deduction for trade or business expenses with respect to group health plans) is 
amended by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3) and by inserting after 
paragraph (1) the following new paragraph: 
 
"(2) PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO 
CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS. – 
 
"(A) IN GENERAL. -- No deduction shall be allowed under this section for 
expenses paid or incurred by an employer for any group health plan 
maintained by such employer unless all such plans maintained by such 
employer meet the continuing coverage requirements of subsection (k). 
 
"(B) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN SMALL EMPLOYEES, ETC. -- 
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any plan described in section 
106(b)(2).". 
 
(b) DENIAL OF EXCLUSION FOR HIGHLY COMPENSATED 
INDIVIDUALS. -- Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to 
contributions by employer to accident and health plans) is amended by inserting  
 
"(a) IN GENERAL. -- " before "Gross" and by inserting at the end thereof 
the following new subsection: 
 
"(b) EXCEPTION FOR HIGHLY COMPENSATED INDIVIDUALS 
WHERE PLAN FAILS TO PROVIDE CERTAIN CONTINUATION 
COVERAGE. – 
 
"(1) IN GENERAL. -- Subsection (a) shall not apply to any amount 
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contributed by an employer on behalf of a highly compensated individual 
(within the meaning of section 105(h)(5)) to a group health plan maintained 
by such employer unless all such plans maintained by such employer meet 




(c) CONTINUATION COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS. -- Section 162 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is amended by redesignating subsection (k) as 
subsection (l) and by inserting after subsection (j) the following new subsection: 
 
"(k) CONTINUATION COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS OF GROUP 
HEALTH PLANS. – 
 
"(1) IN GENERAL. -- For purposes of subsection (i)(2) and section 
106(b)(1), a group health plan meets the requirements of this subsection only 
if each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a 
result of a qualifying event is entitled to elect, within the election period, 





SEC. 10002. TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF COVERAGE AT GROUP RATES 




(a) IN GENERAL. -- Subtitle B of title I of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 
part: 
 




"SEC. 601. PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO 
CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS. 
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"(a) IN GENERAL. -- The plan sponsor of each group health plan shall 
provide, in accordance with this part, that each qualified beneficiary who 
would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is 
entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the election period, continuation 
coverage under the plan. 
 
 
SEC. 10003. CONTINUATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL EMPLOYEES WHO LOST EMPLOYMENT-RELATED COVERAGE 
(PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT AMENDMENTS). 
 
(a) IN GENERAL. -- The Public Health Service Act is amended by adding at the 
end the following new title: 
 
"TITLE XXII -- REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN GROUP HEALTH 
PLANS FOR CERTAIN STATE 
AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES 
 
"SEC. 2201. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL GROUP HEALTH 
PLANS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUATION COVERAGE TO CERTAIN 
INDIVIDUALS. 
 
"(a) IN GENERAL. -- In accordance with regulations which the Secretary 
shall prescribe, each group health plan that is maintained by any State that 
receives funds under this Act, by any political subdivision of such a State, or 
by any agency or instrumentality of such a State or political subdivision, 
shall provide, in accordance with this title, that each qualified beneficiary 
who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is 
entitled, under the plan, to elect, within the election period, continuation 
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